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This Article proposes a state crime against torture by private
actors as a far better way to capture the harm of serious domestic
violence. Current criminal law misses the cumulative terror of
domestic violence by fracturing it into individualized, misdemeanor
batteries. Instead, a torture statute would punish a pattern crime—
the batterer’s use of repeated violence and threats for the purpose of
controlling his victim. And, for the first time, a torture statute would
ban nonviolent techniques committed with the intent to cause severe
pain and suffering, including psychological torture, sexual degrada-
tion, and sleep deprivation.
Because serious domestic violence routinely involves the use of
torture techniques, other scholars have proposed stretching the state
action requirement of international law against torture to apply it to
domestic violence. This Article proposes a simpler solution, urging
states to pass statutes banning torture by private actors. Indeed,
California and Michigan have already done so, seemingly without
controversy and without any real scholarly comment. Both states
have used their general torture statutes to prosecute serious domestic
violence. This proposal would better tailor a torture statute to
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domestic violence and includes ways to motivate the state to prose-
cute torture more often.
Prosecuting domestic violence under a general torture statute
would have both direct and indirect impacts. In addition to provid-
ing a solution to the existing inadequacy of criminal law, it would
also have great rhetorical power. Describing domestic violence as
torture focuses the criminal justice system and the public on the
defendant’s clear premeditation and culpability. We see batterers as
merely angry, whereas we acknowledge torturers as cruel. Although
we see domestic violence victims as weak and masochistic, we do not
blame torture victims for their fate. Describing domestic violence as
torture helps to explain both the purpose of abuse and its full pattern.
2016] CRIMINALIZING “PRIVATE” TORTURE 185
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
I. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CONSTITUTES TORTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
II. WHAT A TORTURE CRIME ACCOMPLISHES FOR DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
A. Criminal Law Does Not Capture the Scope and Harm of 
Domestic Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
B. Most Torture Techniques Remain Legal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
III. A TORTURE STATUTE WOULD SOLVE MANY OF THESE 
LEGAL PROBLEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
A. Using a Torture Statute to Capture the Full Horror of 
Domestic Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
B. Changing the Cultural Perception of Domestic 
Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
IV. DRAFTING A TORTURE STATUTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
A. Existing Torture Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
B. Proposed Torture Statute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
1. Removing the State Action Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
2. Defining Torture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
a. Requiring at Least One Act of Violence . . . . . . . . . . . 236
b. Adding a Pattern Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
3. Torture Should Require Specific Intent but Without a 
Further Purpose Requirement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
C. Making Sure the Torture Statute Does Not Sit on a 
Shelf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
186 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:183
INTRODUCTION
International law defines torture as acts committed by, or with
the complicity of, state actors,1 but the technique of torture is far
more ubiquitous. Our streets are dotted with torture chambers—
houses in which perpetrators use violence, threats, and psychologi-
cal tricks to break the spirit of their victims.2 Because those victims
are usually wives and children, however, the problem fails to cap-
ture much attention.3 Not only is this torture “private” because it is
committed by nonstate actors, but it is doubly private because it
occurs inside the home.4
Others have argued for the application of international and
federal torture laws to domestic violence by stretching the state
action requirement to include the state’s complicity in permitting
domestic violence.5 I propose a simpler solution. States should spe-
cifically criminalize “private” torture—the use of torture techniques
by nonstate actors. A prohibition on torture should not prove
particularly controversial, and to make it even less so, it should
apply broadly to any use of torture, not just to family violence. A
torture law would equally capture the terror of a drug kingpin
exacting information, a kidnapper with a basement of horrors, and
a domestic violence batterer. Indeed, two states, California and
Michigan, have already banned torture generally and have used
their torture statutes to prosecute domestic violence.6
1. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT].
2. See infra Part I.
3. See Paul G. Chevigny, From Betrayal to Violence: Dante’s Inferno and the Social
Construction of Crime, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 787, 798 (2001) (suggesting that the concept
of violence was socially constructed and traditionally focused on stranger violence); Reva B.
Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2206-
07 (1996) (describing the law’s permission to physically chastise a wife and children, a right
that remains as to children, and the ways that the law continues to devalue domestic vio-
lence).
4. See Siegel, supra note 3, at 2153.
5. See, e.g., Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic
Violence as Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 299 (1994).
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 206 (West 2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.85 (2016). California’s
torture statute passed by referendum in 1990, as part of a series of tough on crime measures
collectively designated Proposition 115 Criminal Law-Iniative Constitutional Amendment and
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Once given the statutory tool, prosecutors should routinely pros-
ecute serious domestic violence as torture. Doing so would solve
several existing problems. Current domestic violence statutes fail to
capture its cumulative horror, instead fracturing the patterns of
domestic violence into constituent, de minimis parts.7 Taken
individually, many torture techniques remain perfectly legal, and
most other techniques are classified as mere misdemeanors such as
discrete assaults and batteries.8 We need a law that accomplishes
for domestic violence what stalking statutes did to criminalize that
pattern crime. Before then, a terrifying pattern of intimidation con-
stituted, at best, a few disjointed misdemeanor charges such as
trespassing, while most of the defendant’s behavior remained per-
fectly legal.9
A torture statute would, for the first time, encompass the full
scope of domestic violence.10 It would connect the dots between
sporadic acts of violence and make the perpetrator’s purpose of
controlling his victim relevant. Instead of a fractured series of
misdemeanor battery charges, a torture charge would demonstrate
the terrifying whole. The law would ban other torture techniques
such as sleep deprivation, sexual degradation, and psychological
torture when part of a pattern of violence. It would punish domestic
violence as a felony even when the perpetrator’s primary intent is
to cause physical pain rather than to leave “serious bodily injury.”11
Further, identifying and punishing domestic violence as “torture”
would help the criminal justice system and the public understand
its full scope and horror.12 Indeed, in many ways, these cultural
Statute, Proposition 115, 1990 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 115 (West). For discussion of cases
applying these statutes to domestic violence, see infra notes 254-55 and accompanying text.
7. See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call
to Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 972-73 (2004).
8. See generally Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-
1990, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 46-53 (1992).
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part III.A.
11. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
12. Deborah Tuerkheimer has proposed a broad domestic violence “battering statute” that
would capture the pattern and purpose of domestic violence. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 7,
at 1019-20; see also Alafair S. Burke, Domestic Violence as a Crime of Pattern and Intent: An
Alternative Reconceptualization, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 552, 595-602 (2007) (building on
Tuerkheimer’s arguments to propose a similar statute). I argue, however, that the term
“torture” conveys something more useful.
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signals constitute the most important aspects of our very flawed
criminal justice system.13 A felony crime of torture might help the
public to stop blaming victims for domestic violence and stop
imagining the victims as weak and pathetic or masochistic and fick-
le because the public recognizes that techniques of torture can
control the mind and warp the will of even the most stoic soldiers.
Although the public often confuses domestic violence with the
cumulation of random temper tantrums by a spouse with a nasty
disposition, it tends to understand that torture has a purpose: to
control or to punish.14 Defining domestic violence as torture would
help the public understand that batterers do not merely inflict
temporary physical pain, but cause permanent psychological dam-
age as well. Popular culture gives us insight into the deviousness
of psychological torture and helps us understand why torturers
alternate between inspiring despair and granting hope. All of this
would go a long way to explaining some of the counterintuitive
aspects of domestic violence and to curing our fixation on the
victim’s culpability rather than the perpetrator’s cruelty.
This Article proposes a general torture statute that would apply
to the use of torture techniques by private actors for a variety of
actions, from domestic violence, to child abuse, to preying upon
strangers. Part I describes the evidence that domestic violence
abusers frequently make use of torture techniques. Part II argues
that current law utterly fails to acknowledge the pattern and scope
of domestic violence. Part III argues that a torture statute would
capture the ongoing and varied nature of domestic violence, and
would, for the first time, criminalize the full variety of torture
techniques. A torture statute would also explain the real nature of
domestic violence to prosecutors, judges, juries, and the public. Part
IV then crafts statutory language that works to include the broad
scope of torturous conduct without watering down its impact.
Convincing legislators to pass a torture statute of general applica-
tion should prove entirely uncontroversial. Persuading prosecutors
to charge the crime of felony torture in domestic violence cases
would prove transformative.
13. See infra Part III.B.
14. See infra Part III.B. 
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I. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CONSTITUTES TORTURE
When batterers use violence and psychological torment in order
to control their victims, they engage in torture.15 Although torturers
within the home may make use of fewer physical chains than our
paradigmatic examples, they utilize every other tool of the trade.
Almost every torture technique catalogued in human rights schol-
arship matches the strange and sadistic ways that batterers
routinely exercise power: from the creative and sporadic use of
violence, to sensory deprivation, to attacks on the personality of the
victim.16 Simply put, the most effective methods of breaking down
and controlling another human being have not altered much in hu-
man history.17
The reader may object that such depressing torture chambers
cannot be common. In some ways, that empirical question does not
matter to my proposal for a torture statute. Regardless, making this
15. See, e.g., Jane Maslow Cohen, Regimes of Private Tyranny: What Do They Mean to
Morality and for the Criminal Law?, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 757, 763 (1996) (framing the
battering relationship as an ongoing “regime of private tyranny”); Mary Ann Dutton, Un-
derstanding Women’s Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman
Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1204-10 (1993) (discussing broader social science
definitions of the nature, pattern, and severity of violence and abuse); Elizabeth M. Schneider,
Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-
Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 537-38 (1992) (characterizing what she calls “broader
description[s]” of battering in an attempt to capture interrelated aspects of coercion, power,
and control not limited to physical abuse); Shannon Selden, The Practice of Domestic Violence,
12 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 18 (2001) (conceptualizing domestic abuse as torture and noting
that “intimate violence involves separate attacks of physical injury, strung together by
patterns of domination, coercion, and control.... [T]he violence that occurs may be merely one
tool of domination among many.”).
16. One scholar attempted to catalogue those techniques looking at torture cases from
around the world. He listed isolation, psychological debilitation (including sleep deprivation),
sensory assault (shouting or loud noise), induced desperation (random punishment or reward,
implanting guilt, abandonment, or learned helplessness), threats to self or others, sexual
humiliation, feral treatment (forced nakedness, denial of personal hygiene), desecration
(forcing victim to violate religious practices), and finally pharmacological manipulation (forced
use of drugs). See Almerindo E. Ojeda, What Is Psychological Torture?, in THE TRAUMA OF
PYCHOLOGICAL TORTURE 1, 2-3 (Almerindo E. Ojeda ed., 2008).
17. Cf. Shazia Qureshi, Reconceptualising Domestic Violence as ‘Domestic Torture,’ 20 J.
POL. STUD. 35, 39 (2013) (“Curiously, batterers do not receive any formal training for torture,
yet the methods of abuse not only coincide with those of the other batterers’ but also bear
resemblance with torture inflicted by state officials.”).
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charge available to prosecutors in any case involving the horrors
described in detail below would matter enormously.
Torture is, in fact, entirely ubiquitous. First, domestic violence
itself is absurdly common. The Centers for Disease Control esti-
mates that one out of four American women will be severely beaten
by a partner in her lifetime.18 The World Health Organization puts
the worldwide average at one in three.19 Even if a fraction of those
cases involve what this Article attempts to proscribe as torture, it
would represent an extraordinary number of cases. Indeed, the
empirical evidence on domestic violence, discussed in detail below,
shows that it typically involves (1) a pattern of violence, rather than
random individualized acts; (2) done for the purpose of control; and
(3) accompanied with the use of other techniques that we associate
with torture.20 Social scientist Evan Stark estimates that 60 per-
cent of domestic violence involves “domestic terrorism.”21
18. Matthew J. Breiding et al., Ctrs. for Disease Control, Prevalence and Characteristics
of Sexual Violence, Stalking, and Intimate Partner Violence Victimization — National Intimate
Partner and Sexual Violence Survey, United States, 2011, CDC SURVEILLANCE SUMMARIES,
Sept. 5, 2014, www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/ss/ss6308.pdf [https://perma.cc/8M3H-PEEF] (“The
lifetime prevalence of physical violence by an intimate partner was an estimated 31.5% among
women and in the 12 months before taking the survey, an estimated 4.0% of women expe-
rienced some form of physical violence by an intimate partner. An estimated 22.3% of women
experienced at least one act of severe physical violence by an intimate partner during their
lifetimes. With respect to individual severe physical violence behaviors, being slammed
against something was experienced by an estimated 15.4% of women, and being hit with a fist
or something hard was experienced by 13.2% of women. In the 12 months before taking the
survey, an estimated 2.3% of women experienced at least one form of severe physical violence
by an intimate partner.”). See also John Wihbey, Domestic Violence and Abusive Relation-
ships: Research Review, JOURNALIST’S RESOURCE, http://www.journalistsresource.org/studies/
society/gender-society/domestic-violence-abusive-relationships-research-review#sthash.
1zNq.dpuf [https://perma.cc/JL4S-RQC9].
19. See K.M. Devries et al., The Global Prevalence of Intimate Partner Violence Against
Women, 340 SCI. 1527, 1527 (2013) (finding in their peer-reviewed metastudy that “in 2010,
30.0% [95% confidence interval (CI) 27.8 to 32.2%] of women aged 15 and over have experi-
enced, during their lifetime, physical and/or sexual intimate partner violence” (alteration in
original)).
20. Michael Johnson, for example, has attempted to categorize domestic violence into four
types: mutual violent control, situational couple violence (signaled only by an event), violent
resistance (a partner acting only to resist ongoing abuse), and the category that my torture
statute would focus on, “intimate terrorism.” See Michael P. Johnson, Conflict and Control:
Gender Symmetry and Asymmetry in Domestic Violence, 12 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1003,
1006 (2006).
21. See Peter Cohn, Evan Stark, Rutgers, VIMEO (Apr. 2, 2010), https://vimeo.com/
11114721 [https://perma.cc/CZ4L-8AKH]; The Academics: Causes and Prevention of Domestic
2016] CRIMINALIZING “PRIVATE” TORTURE 191
My own work with domestic violence victims, as a prosecutor and
a lawyer representing survivors in family law, has provided me with
plenty of anecdotal evidence to equate much domestic violence with
torture. Over the past fifteen years, victims have described to me
eerily similar accounts of creative cruelty. I include some of these
insights below.
First, in the most obvious analogy to torture, domestic violence
abusers use violence in forms both mundane and creative, and they
use violence over time.22 Slaps and shoves escalate to beatings and
strangulation.23 Batterers focus on vulnerable parts of the body, like
breasts and genitals.24 They also sometimes evade detection by hit-
ting places that do not reveal bruises so easily. They use their fists,
but also burn with cigarettes and cut with knives.25
In torture, actual violence constitutes a means for control rather
than an end in and of itself.26 As such, threats punctuated with
sporadic violence prove far more effective than constant violence.27
The torturer gives the victim the illusion of some control over pain
by being compliant.28 Consistent and regular violence would not
serve the same purpose of forcing the victim to be hyper-vigilant
and terrified of what might come next. That is the somewhat
Violence—Evan Stark, POWER AND CONTROL: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN AMERICA, http://www.
powerandcontrolfilm.com/the-topics/academics/evan-stark [https://perma.cc/KJ7U-LMKB].
22. Evan Stark, The Dangers of Dangerousness Assessment, 6 FAM. & INTIMATE PARTNER
VIOLENCE Q. 13, 18-19 (2013) (arguing that, as the system pays more attention to the most
egregious forms of physical domestic violence, batterers focus more on “coercive control,” the
use of psychological torture, and constant low-level violence as a means of enforcing the
deprivation of liberty).
23. Lisa Marie De Sanctis, Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence and Justice
for Victims of Domestic Violence, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 359, 388 (1996) (noting that
“domestic violence usually escalates in frequency and severity”).
24. See Copelon, supra note 5, at 312 (“Some women are threatened with mutilation of
their breasts or genitals and suffer permanent disfigurement.”).
25. Id. at 311.
26. See Hernán Reyes, The Worst Scars Are in the Mind: Psychological Torture, 89 INT’L
REV. RED CROSS 591, 614-15 (2007).
27. See Karla Fischer et al., The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation in
Domestic Violence Cases, 46 SMU L. REV. 2117, 2128-29 (1993) (“[V]iolence does not need to
be a constant presence for the victims to feel threatened that it could erupt at any point, nor
does the explosion always have to be physical. Violence need only symbolize the threat of
future abuse in order to keep the victim in fear and control her behavior.... In fact, physical
abuse may only be utilized by abusers who are too unsophisticated to be able to control their
victims with verbal or sexual violence.” (footnotes omitted)).
28. See Reyes, supra note 26, at 614.
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counterintuitive pattern that we see in domestic violence. Usually
batterers do not use a torrent of uncontrolled violence, but rather
violence that is purposeful and sporadic.29 Indeed, the seriousness
of violence does not necessarily predict whether the batterer will
ultimately murder his victim; his level of control over her does.30
Violence may not even constitute the most useful tool of torture.
The threat of violence, whether explicit or implicit, may do as much
work as its actual infliction.31 To give an idea of how creative and
commonplace these threats are, consider that a majority of the vic-
tims I have interviewed reported one or more of the following
threats: (1) the explicit threat to kill the victim and bury her body
at a specified location where it would never be recovered; (2) the
implicit threat of the batterer cleaning his gun in front of the vic-
tim when making a point; and (3) the nonverbal threat of veering
the car as if to crash it, or grabbing the wheel of the car while the
victim is driving.
More effectively still, batterers threaten to kill those whom the
victim cares about, from family members to the family dog.32
Threats to pets are so common that several states have incorporated
such threats into their protective order law.33 Abusers will eagerly
show news clippings to their victims after some other batterer
29. See Fischer et al., supra note 27, at 2128.
30. See Stark, supra note 22, at 18-20.
31. See Fischer et al., supra note 27, at 2132 (“[F]ear may also be triggered by any verbal
or nonverbal symbol associated with the onset of an abusive incident. In some cases, threats
of harm ... may be as effective in controlling her behavior as physical violence itself.” (footnote
omitted)).
32. See Frank R. Ascione et al., The Abuse of Animals and Domestic Violence: A National
Survey of Shelters for Women Who Are Battered, 5 SOC’Y & ANIMALS 205, 208 (1997) (noting
that in a survey of women entering a domestic violence center in Utah, 71 percent of those
who reported that they currently or recently owned pets indicated that their batterer had
threatened, harmed, or killed their pet); Vivek Upadhya, Comment, The Abuse of Animals as
a Method of Domestic Violence: The Need for Criminalization, 63 EMORY L.J. 1163, 1171-74
(2014); Stacy Teicher Khadaroo, Texas Family Killed: In Domestic Violence Cases, More Focus
on Red Flags, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 11, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/
Justice/2014/0711/Texas-family-killed-In-domestic-violence-cases-more-focus-on-red-flags-
video [https://perma.cc/77FU-Y9SB] (suggesting that “[t]he killing of family members of
domestic violence victims is on the rise across the country”).
33. See Joshua L. Friedman & Gary C. Norman, Protecting the Family Pet: The New Face
of Maryland Domestic Violence Protective Orders, 40 U. BALT. L.F. 81, 93-94, 94 n.99 (2009)
(noting that including animals in protective orders began with Maine in 2006 and had
expanded to fourteen states by 2009).
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actually engages in a killing spree of his victim’s parents, siblings,
coworkers, or friends.34
Most effectively of all, batterers routinely threaten to harm or kill
their own children.35 Studies show an overwhelming overlap be-
tween domestic violence and child abuse.36 Victims who disobey thus
risk not only their own lives and safety, but also those of their
children. In the ultimate exercise of power, some batterers in fact
murder their own children.37 
Even leaving the batterer may not protect the victim’s children.
Batterers routinely threaten to gain custody of the children as pun-
ishment, so escaping from the torture chamber requires leaving
hostages behind.38 These are not idle threats. Batterers are far more
34. Cf. Copelon, supra note 5, at 313 (describing the psychological effect of threats to kill
the victim’s family). For an example of a news clipping, see Khadaroo, supra note 32.
35. See Howard A. Davidson, Child Abuse and Domestic Violence: Legal Connections and
Controversies, 29 FAM. L.Q. 357, 363 (1995) (“[M]any batterers threaten to kill their partners,
their children, or their partner’s children if their partners leave the relationship. Some
batterers have carried out such threats.”).
36. Id. at 357 (“When spouse abuse was severe, one study found 77 percent of the children
in those homes had also been abused.”); id. at 369 (“Estimates are that between 3.3 million
and 10 million children annually observe domestic violence within their homes. An estimated
87 percent of children in homes with domestic violence witness that abuse.” (footnote
omitted)).
37. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 752-54 (2005) (describing how
plaintiff’s ex-husband took their three daughters, aged ten, nine, and seven, in violation of a
protective order and then murdered them all). In the last year, there have been several occa-
sions in which a father with a history of domestic violence murdered his child or children. See
Ashley Harding, No Bond for Father Charged in Son’s Death, NEWS4JAX (Nov. 13, 2015, 3:15
PM), http://www.news4jax.com/news/local/no-bond-for-father-charged-in-sons-death [https://
perma.cc/4G3A-SRAP]; Jessica Kartalija, Police: Father Admits to Killing 2-Year-Old
Daughter, Mother, CBS BALT. (Feb. 3, 2016, 5:26 PM), http://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2016/
02/03/woman-slain-with-2-year-old-daughter-was-2nd-grade-teacher/ [https://perma.cc/5QER-
AQHF]; Jason Pohl & Jacy Marmaduke, Colo. Girl’s Killing Shocks ‘Peaceful’ Neighborhood,
COLORADOAN (Mar. 31, 2016, 7:09 AM), http://www.coloradoan.com/story/news/2016/03/30/
girls-killing-shocks-peaceful-colorado-neighbhood/82428366/ [https://perma.cc/YN43-249C].
38. See OLA BARNETT ET AL., FAMILY VIOLENCE ACROSS THE LIFESPAN 301 (2d ed. 2005)
(“Many IPV [Intimate Partner Violence] perpetrators threaten their victims with death or
inform the victims that they will take the children, hurt the children, or both.”); see also 
Lundy Bancroft, Understanding the Batterer in Custody and Visitation Disputes (1998) (self-
published article), http://lundybancroft.com/articles/understanding-the-batterer-in-custody-
and-visitation-disputes/ [https://perma.cc/2TEL-WQKG] (“A batterer also tends to involve his
children in the abuse of the mother.... He may threaten to take the children away from her,
legally or illegally.”).
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likely than nonviolent fathers to seek, and to succeed at winning,
custody of their children.39
Batterers also make use of more subtle torture techniques that
are ordinarily considered innocuous under current criminal law.40
When the CIA did experiments in the 1950s to decipher the torture
techniques used to make its most stalwart soldiers crack, it found
that mental torture and sensory deprivation worked surprisingly
well.41 Batterers also, for example, frequently make use of sleep
deprivation as an effective way to incapacitate their victims.42
Exhaustion makes every life activity, from working to parenting,
difficult and seriously impairs the victim’s ability to plot escape.43
My own clients described batterers who woke them up routinely
and did so in jarring or terrifying ways. Sometimes their abusers
turned on all the lights or blared music. Worse yet, one woke up his
39. Cf. Joan S. Meier, Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection:
Understanding Judicial Resistance and Imagining the Solutions, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 657, 678, 707-08 (2003) (describing the significant barriers for domestic violence
victims attempting to protect their children from abusers, from the application of “friendly
parent” provisions to an overreliance on custody evaluators unqualified to determine the
factual issue of the reality of abuse); Bancroft, supra note 38 (“A batterer who does file for
custody will frequently win, as he has numerous advantages over his partner in custody
litigation,” including his ability to afford better representation, to better pass psychological
testing, and to manipulate custody evaluators and the children.).
40. Some batterers use “hybrid techniques”—methods that do not leave any physical
marks on the body but still cause severe physical or psychological pain. See Copelon, supra
note 5, at 313 (“Such hybrid techniques include forcing prisoners to assume positions such as
wall-standing for prolonged periods, thereby causing agonizing pain without directly
administering it.... Sensory deprivation techniques, which create anxiety and disorientation,
include exposure to continuous, loud noises, hooding, alternating darkness with blinding light,
sleep deprivation, starvation and dehydration.”).
41. See David Luban & Henry Shue, Mental Torture: A Critique of Erasures in U.S. Law,
100 GEO. L.J. 823, 833 (2012) (“[S]eemingly minor manipulations of a prisoner’s environ-
ment—disruptions of space and time by capriciously varied schedules and environment,
isolation, sensory and sleep deprivation, irregular sleep, and extremes of hot and cold—could
cause major degradations of the victim’s personality.”). 
42. See id. at 831; see also James P. Terry, Torture and the Interrogation of Detainees, 32
CAMPBELL L. REV. 595, 601 (2010) (explaining that sleep deprivation can reduce a victim’s
tolerance to pain).
43. Sleep deprivation causes as much impairment to activities like driving as being drunk
does. See A.M. Williamson & Anne-Marie Feyer, Moderate Sleep Deprivation Produces Impair-
ments in Cognitive and Motor Performance Equivalent to Legally Prescribed Levels of Alcohol
Intoxication, 57 OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 649, 653 (2000) (reporting the results of a
study that concluded that “commonly experienced levels of sleep deprivation depressed per-
formance to a level equivalent to that produced by alcohol intoxication of at least a BAC
[Blood Alcohol Concentration] of 0.05%”).
2016] CRIMINALIZING “PRIVATE” TORTURE 195
wife by spraying her with mace, and another by raping her. All of
this made sleep permanently difficult, even after escaping the re-
lationship.
Like any good torturer, batterers particularly focus on sexual
violence as the most effective way to break a victim’s spirit.44 They
routinely rape their victims, a practice only recently made illegal
within marriage.45 Just as effectively, and without breaking current
criminal law, batterers use sexual humiliation—from conducting
sexual “inspections” designed to sniff out alleged adultery, to co-
ercing the victim into degrading sexual practices.46 The use of shame
serves multiple purposes: it creates searing psychological scars and
it further isolates the victim from help as she correctly guesses at
the world’s reaction.47
Batterers also use variations on the psychological torture
techniques that the CIA has determined to be effective, including
mind games and “crazy-making” behavior.48 They tell the victim
44. See Fischer et al., supra note 27, at 2123; Reyes, supra note 26, at 605-06;
(“Researchers who have investigated the phenomenon find that rates of battered women
who have been sexually assaulted consistently fall in the thirty-three percent to sixty percent
range. Sexual abuse frequently involves acts that could also be classified as physical assaults,
blurring the line between physical and sexual abuse, such as the insertion of objects into the
woman’s vagina, forced anal or oral sex, bondage, forced sex with others, and sex with ani-
mals.” (footnotes omitted)). This translates to an extraordinary 15.8 percent of all U.S. women
experiencing forms of sexual violence by an intimate partner in their lifetimes. See Breiding
et al., supra note 18, at 9.
45. See Breiding et al., supra note 18, at 6 (describing the prevalence of intimate partner
rape); see also Jessica Klarfeld, A Striking Disconnect: Marital Rape Law’s Failure to Keep Up
with Domestic Violence Law, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1819, 1830 n.92, 1833 (2011) (noting that
marital rape was banned in all fifty states by 1993, but exceptions remain to certain types of
marital rape in criminal law). In many states, marital rape is excluded from tort law by the
interspousal tort immunity doctrine. See Sarah M. Harless, From the Bedroom to the
Courtroom: The Impact of Domestic Violence Law on Marital Rape Victims, 35 RUTGERS L.J.
305, 333 (2003).
46. See Copelon, supra note 5, at 311, 313.
47. See Copelon, supra note 5, at 315.
48. One example of this is “gas lighting.” The term “gas lighting” is based upon the play,
Gas Light, that was made into films in 1940 and 1944, in which a husband attempts to drive
his wife insane by manipulating her environment in small ways and claiming she imagined
it. See Judith L. Alpert et al., Comment on Ornstein, Ceci, and Loftus (1998): Adult
Recollections of Childhood Abuse, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1052, 1063 (1998).
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that she imagined the abuse or that she is merely overly sensitive.49
They hide objects and tell her that she lost them.50
Another technique that batterers utilize is to intersperse vio-
lence and threats with kindness and false hope.51 They begin, as
described above, by working hard to establish an emotional con-
nection before striking.52 Some become masterful at alternating
cruelty with effective appeals to victims’ generosity, forgiveness,
and guilt.53 Lenore Walker, a distinguished researcher in the field
of battered woman syndrome,54 famously described a “cycle of
violence” including a tension-building phase, violence, and then a
honeymoon period in which the batterer pleas for forgiveness and
acts with kindness.55
Batterers use stalking and surveillance to monitor their victims
and to instill a sense of the batterers’ own omnipotence.56 They
follow and monitor, demanding constant contact from the victim to
avoid punishment.57 They check their victims’ cell phones and hack
into their e-mail.58 Technology has made this terrifyingly easy,
allowing a batterer to establish his victim’s whereabouts with a
mere computer search for her smart phone location.59 This stalking
49. See NEIL S. JACOBSON & JOHN M. GOTTMAN, WHEN MEN BATTER WOMEN: NEW
INSIGHTS INTO ENDING ABUSIVE RELATIONSHIPS 129-32 (1998).
50. See id. at 131; EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: HOW MEN ENTRAP WOMEN IN
PERSONAL LIFE 254-55 (2006).
51. See LUNDY BANCROFT, WHY DOES HE DO THAT?: INSIDE THE MINDS OF ANGRY AND
CONTROLLING MEN 65-66 (2002).
52. See id. at 65-67.
53. See id.
54. See David L. Faigman, Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A
Legal and Empirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. REV. 619, 622 & n.10 (1986).
55. See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 55 (1979). Some authors have crit-
icized Walker for being overly simplistic and have argued that many abusive relationships do
not fit the paradigm so neatly. See, e.g., Faigman, supra note 54, at 636-42. In my experience,
victims are rarely fooled by batterers’ ploys (though they may defend the abuser to the world
out of embarrassment at having chosen him). But victims frequently feel responsible for
caring for abusers, who often have truly heart-wrenching tales of growing up in abusive
households and struggling with the difficulties of the world.
56. See Justine A. Dunlap, Intimate Terrorism and Technology: There’s an App for That,
7 U. MASS. L. REV. 10, 23 (2012).
57. See id. at 18-19.
58. See id. at 18, 22.
59. See id. at 23 (noting that technologies such as global positioning systems (GPS),
spyware, and social media make it “easier, scarier, and deadlier” for a batterer to “under-
min[e] the will ... and ... ability of the victim to resist”). Indeed, a National Public Radio
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technology also allows the abuser to appear “omnipresent and om-
niscient to the victim,” thus extending his control past even the
expansive reaches of his monitoring.60
Batterers create rules and micro-regulations of daily life, from
what the victim may wear to who she can talk to.61 Using this
technique the perpetrator creates a world in which the victim is
constantly monitored and criticized; every move is measured
against an unpredictable, ever-changing and unknowable “rule-
book.”62 The victim’s attempt to survive leads to constant anxiety
and vigilance to avoid displeasing the torturer.63 The experience of
walking on eggshells becomes so excruciating that some victims
actually provoke an attack to get it over with.64
Most commonly of all, batterers use constant verbal cruelty to
degrade their victims.65 We minimize this under the category of
“emotional abuse,” but it creates some of the most lasting wounds
inflicted under a regime of torture.66 They use relentless criticism
survey found that 54 percent of domestic violence shelters ask survivors to disable GPS on
their devices, and even more startling, 85 percent of shelters are working directly with victims
whose abusers have tracked them via GPS. Aarti Shahani, Smartphones Are Used to Stalk,
Control Domestic Abuse Victims, NPR (Sept. 15, 2014, 4:22 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/
15/346149979/smartphones-are-used-to-stalk-control-domesticabuse-victims [https://perma.cc/
XJ2R-VMZC].
60. Dunlap, supra note 56, at 23.
61. See STARK, supra note 50, at 32, 203.
62. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTORIA, SPECIALIST FAMILY VIOLENCE SERVICES: THE HEART
OF AN EFFECTIVE SYSTEM 9-10 (2015) (citing STARK, supra note 50).
63. See Dutton, supra note 15, at 1221.
64. See Rhonda Copelon, Intimate Terror: Understanding Domestic Violence as Torture,
in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN 116, 124 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994) (“For some women, the
psychological terror is the worst part. Indeed, it can be so great that women will precipitate
battering as opposed to enduring the fear.”). This use of violence by the victim tends to gut her
credibility in the criminal justice system. See Faigman, supra note 54, at 621-22.
65. See DAWN BRADLEY BERRY, THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SOURCEBOOK 2-4 (1998)
(“‘[D]omestic violence’ is generally understood to include ... [e]motional abuse [including, but
not limited to,] [c]onsistently doing or saying things to shame, insult, ridicule, embarrass,
demean, belittle, or mentally hurt another person.... It also involves withholding money,
affection, or attention; [and] forbidding someone to ... see friends or family.”).
66. See Nora Sveaass, Destroying Minds: Psychological Pain and the Crime of Torture, 11
N.Y.C. L. REV. 303, 314 (2008); Tuerkheimer, supra note 7, at 968 (“Victims of domestic
violence often identify nonphysical abuse as a critical component of the battering dynamic.
Indeed, ‘some battered women have described psychological degradation and humiliation as
the most painful abuse they have experienced.’” (quoting Fischer et al., supra note 27, at
2123)).
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and belittlement and they degrade and humiliate their victim.67
Further, batterers have an advantage over those who torture
strangers because the batterers have the opportunity to persuade
their victim to entrust them with their secrets and emotional weak
points.68
The only major distinction between domestic violence and the
catalogue of torture techniques used elsewhere is that we normally
associate torture with kidnapping or confinement of the victim.
Batterers sometimes imprison their victims,69 but more often they
isolate them in less obvious ways. They almost always wait to begin
abuse until they have their victims legally and emotionally entan-
gled with them, often hitting for the first time on the wedding night
or when the victim is pregnant.70 Batterers use threats to prevent
escape: threats of violence to the victim and her loved ones, threats
to fight for custody of the victim’s children, threats to impoverish
the victim and her children, and threats to falsely accuse the victim
of crimes.71 Batterers isolate victims by punishing them for contact
with their friends and family.72 The resulting isolation may not
67. See Sveaass, supra note 66, at 316 (“Psychological torture is deliberate and targeted
attacks on the mind and dignity of the person—through humiliation, through degrading
mocking, through forcing people into shameful actions and positions and impossible choices.”).
68. See Selden, supra note 15, at 13-14 (“Like the torturer to the prisoner, a man in an
intimate relationship has continuous access to the woman he beats. They are, or began as,
lovers, spouses, partners. The word ‘intimate’ describes a proximity between individuals that
is not identified in other relationships.”).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Dowd, 417 F.3d 1080, 1083 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming the
conviction of a defendant for federal domestic violence based on his beating, kidnapping, and
taking of the victim across state lines).
70. See ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 42 (1987) (“Typically—in 72
percent to 77 percent of the cases—violence occurs only after a couple has become seriously
involved, is engaged, or is living together; rather than in the early, more casual stages of
dating.”).
71. See Sarah M. Buel, Fifty Obstacles to Leaving, a.k.a., Why Abuse Victims Stay, 28
COLO. LAW. 19, 19-26 (1999) (listing the above reasons and many more). If a victim seeks help
from the criminal justice system, at best, it will respond with a misdemeanor prosecution of
the perpetrator with no offer of protection for her. See Julia Henderson Gist et al., Protection
Orders and Assault Charges: Do Justice Interventions Reduce Violence Against Women, 15 AM.
J. FAM. L. 59, 68 (2001) (reporting the results of a six-month longitudinal study that found
that among sixty-five abused women applying and qualifying for a protection order, only half
initially received the order).
72. See Buel, supra note 71, at 22.
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match that of solitary confinement, but it still takes an enormous
psychological toll.73
State v. Norman is a case that demonstrates most of these tor-
ture techniques.74 J.T. Norman regularly beat Judy, his wife of
twenty-five years, using a fist or any object at hand, burned her
with cigarettes, and smashed glass against her face.75 He knocked
her down the stairs while she was pregnant, which resulted in the
death of their child.76 He sexually humiliated her and forced her to
work as a prostitute.77 He used psychological torture, calling her
“bitch,” “whore,” and “dog,” and making her sleep on the floor and
eat dog food.78 He threatened to kill her in very specific ways if she
attempted to leave or to call for help.79 At trial an expert testified
that the abuse resembled the treatment that the Nazis gave to
prisoners-of-war (POW) or the brainwashing techniques used dur-
ing the Korean War.80
As I discuss next, a court would have deemed little of this evi-
dence of torture relevant in a prosecution of J.T. Norman for
individual discrete acts of domestic violence. Indeed, the State did
not prosecute Norman at all.81 Almost the only legal arena in which
domestic violence victims have the opportunity to describe the full
horror of their abuse is in their own trials for killing their batterers
73. See JOHN T. CACIOPPO & WILLIAM PATRICK, LONELINESS: HUMAN NATURE AND THE
NEED FOR SOCIAL CONNECTION 99-108 (2008) (describing five ways that loneliness negatively
impacts human health); see also Rona M. Fields, The Neurobiological Consequences of
Psychological Torture, in THE TRAUMA OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TORTURE, supra note 16, at 139, 139
(arguing that feelings of fear and powerlessness can have medical consequences); Stuart
Grassian, Neuropsychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, in THE TRAUMA OF PSYCHOLOG-
ICAL TORTURE, supra note 16, at 113, 121-24 (discussing the psychological effects of solitary
confinement through the story of Jose Padilla); Atul Gawande, Hellhole, NEW YORKER (Mar.
30, 2009), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/03/30/hellhole [https://perma.cc/Z9QY-
QFY4] (discussing long-term solitary confinement).
74. 366 S.E.2d 586 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988), rev’d, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989).





80. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 17-18 (N.C. 1989) (Martin, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 17.
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when they present their self-defense arguments.82 In this case, as in
many, Judy Norman’s horror stories failed to earn her acquittal.83
II. WHAT A TORTURE CRIME ACCOMPLISHES FOR DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE
Against this backdrop, it becomes easier to understand the utter
failure of criminal law to grapple with domestic violence. Current
law criminalizes batterers’ violence and explicit threats of violence
but almost no other form of torture.84 Part of this stems from the
fact that U.S. criminal law does not prioritize most violence as much
as it does narcotics or property crime.85 Violence constitutes a mere
misdemeanor unless it involves “serious bodily injury” or weapons;86
even cigarette burns to genitals might not rise to a felony.87 But
criminal law also fails to adequately address domestic violence in
82. See Burke, supra note 12, at 580-81; Lenore E.A. Walker, Battered Women Syndrome
and Self-Defense, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 321, 326 (1992).
83. After an escalating day of violence, Judy Norman killed her husband while he slept.
Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 13. The trial court determined that these circumstances did not meet
the legal definition of “imminent danger” necessary for perfect self-defense. Id. As a result,
the jury was not instructed on the law related to self-defense, and the case resulted in a
voluntary manslaughter conviction. Id. at 9. The state appellate court ordered a new trial,
holding that the existence of battered spouse syndrome, in certain circumstances, “does not
preclude the defense of perfect self-defense” for the “unlawful killing of a passive victim.”
Norman, 366 S.E.2d at 592. However, the State Supreme Court reversed and upheld the
initial conviction. Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 14-16. For arguments about why self-defense law
fails to understand the kind of imminent danger faced by domestic violence victims, see
generally ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING (2000), and
Sarah M. Buel, Effective Assistance of Counsel for Battered Women Defendants: A Normative
Construct, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 217 (2003).
84. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 7, at 971-72.
85. See generally Eve Buzawa et al., Responding to Crimes of Violence Against Women:
Gender Difference Versus Organizational Imperatives, 41 CRIME & DELINQ. 443, 443, 445
(1995); Jane W. Ellis, Prosecutorial Discretion to Charge in Cases of Spousal Assault: A Dia-
logue, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 56, 57-58 (1984); Margaret E. Martin, Mandatory Arrest
for Domestic Violence: The Courts’ Response, 19 CRIM. JUST. REV. 212, 212-13 (1994).
86. Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, Sufficiency of Bodily Injury to Support Charge of
Aggravated Assault, 5 A.L.R.5th 243 (1992).
87.  See, e.g., Souder v. Commonwealth, 719 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Ky. 1986) (cigarette burns
to the mouth, standing alone, were not serious enough to constitute “serious physical injury”
for first-degree assault), overruled on other grounds by B.B. v. Commonwealth, 226 S.W.3d
47 (Ky. 2007). But cf. United States v. Peneaux, 432 F.3d 882, 890-91 (8th Cir. 2005) (uphold-
ing a felony assault conviction for inflicting serious bodily injury on a child by extinguishing
a lit cigarette on her body).
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more particular ways. Criminal law does not recognize domestic
violence as a pattern crime and instead treats it as individual,
isolated incidents.88 Because of these inadequacies, the law fails to
explain the nature of domestic violence to the public, instead
dividing it into a thousand minimal, constituent parts.89
A. Criminal Law Does Not Capture the Scope and Harm of
Domestic Violence
Domestic violence violates an array of statutes, from battery, to
trespass, to attempted murder.90 In the 1980s, states created specific
domestic violence statutes to make clear that no informal exception
for violence against an intimate partner existed.91 States did so,
however, by merely relabeling misdemeanor battery between inti-
mates as the crime of “domestic violence.”92 They did not alter the
fundamental nature of the charges already available, which were
designed for far more singular acts of violence inflicted on strangers
or acquaintances.93 As Alifair Burke points out, domestic violence
reformers have focused more on procedural attempts to improve the
criminal justice system than on examining the limitations of statu-
tory law.94
Most criminal law statutes remain “transaction-bound,” focused
on a single and discrete action.95 These statutes generally function
well to capture the harm of stranger violence. The harm of a bar
88. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 7, at 960-61.
89. See id.
90. See Dutton, supra note 15, at 1204.
91. These statutes did accomplish a few things: At a practical level, they helped to capture
the quantity of domestic violence by labeling it explicitly. See Zorza, supra note 8, at 62. They
helped law enforcement direct special services to victims. See id. at 56. States also allowed
warrantless arrests in domestic violence cases (despite some general prohibitions on such
arrests in other misdemeanor cases) and many states passed “mandatory arrest” statutes. See
id. at 61-65. Domestic violence statutes also sometimes raised penalties for repeat offenses.
See Anne Yantus, Sentence Creep: Increasing Penalties in Michigan and the Need for
Sentencing Reform, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 645, 657, 664 (2014).
92. See Zorza, supra note 8, at 62-63.
93. Tuerkheimer, supra note 7, at 960, 971-74 (arguing that current domestic violence
laws are “[p]remised on a transactional model of crime that isolates and decontextualizes
violence”).
94. Burke, supra note 12, at 565-66.
95. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 7, at 972.
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fight, for example, is usually contained by a single act of battery.
But the law falls short when applied to years of abuse ranging from
shoves to strangulation.96 At best, a prosecutor can choose frag-
mented pieces of the whole by asking the victim to remember a few
particular batteries. Thus, a batterer’s reign of terror constitutes
nothing more than the sum of any of its parts that can be singled
out and shown in isolation.97
Transaction-bound offenses are not, in fact, a requirement of
criminal law. Conspiracy statutes have long allowed the description
of patterns of crimes; racketeering laws do so even more expan-
sively.98 Both conspiracy and racketeering would prove quite
valuable to allow a prosecutor to fully describe the pattern of harm
in domestic violence cases, except that each statute requires more
than one perpetrator.99 Batterers usually act alone, conspiring with
no one.
In the 1990s, states outlawed stalking, thereby acknowledging
a pattern crime committed by an individual perpetrator.100 Before
the passage of stalking statutes, prosecutors would have to pursue
a terrifying pattern of following, monitoring, and implied threats
with individual de minimis charges like trespassing.101 Stalking
96. See Burke, supra note 12, at 555; Tuerkheimer, supra note 7, at 960-61; see also Buel,
supra note 83, at 233 (explaining that courts address only individual incidents of violence,
rather than the pattern of abuse); Carla M. da Luz, A Legal and Social Comparison of
Heterosexual and Same-Sex Domestic Violence: Similar Inadequacies in Legal Recognition and
Response, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 251, 264 (1994) (“Because the criminal codes
generally already provide remedies against typical forms of domestic abuse such as battery,
property destruction and criminal threat, most states do not designate domestic violence as
a separate crime.”); G. Kristian Miccio, With All Due Deliberate Care: Using International
Law and the Federal Violence Against Women Act to Locate the Contours of State Re-
sponsibility for Violence Against Mothers in the Age of Deshaney, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 641, 672 n.147 (1998) (“Because most jurisdictions do not classify domestic violence as
a separate crime, intimate violence is subsumed in general crime classifications, e.g., murders,
rapes, larceny.”).
97. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 7, at 973.
98. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012) (conspiracy); id. §§ 1961-1962 (racketeering).
99. See id. § 371 (requiring “two or more persons”); id. §§ 1961-1962 (requiring an
“enterprise”).
100. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 186157, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON STALKING
AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, at v-vii (2001), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojp/186157.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R8YY-SN6F].
101. See Burke, supra note 12, at 589 (stating that before stalking laws, individual
incidents “seem[ed] innocuous ... even flattering”); Tuerkheimer, supra note 7, at 1004-05.
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captures the full array of harm done by a single individual over
time.102 
Domestic violence, however, remains mired in the world of
fragmentation.103 Not only do the available charges fail to present
a full picture of the pattern and scope of violence, the rules of
evidence often forbid painting such a picture at trial. A prosecutor
conducting a trial of a single individualized act of violence often will
be prohibited from bringing in evidence of all the other crimes com-
mitted by the batterer against his victim.104 Under Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b), the law frowns on bringing in “prior bad acts” to
prove current wrongdoing as “propensity” evidence.105 Courts do not
allow prosecutors to prove, for example, that a defendant committed
the charged bank robbery merely because he has robbed ten other
banks.106
Pursuant to Rule 404(b), the prosecutor must go to the trouble of
giving notice and then defending against a motion to exclude evi-
dence of prior bad acts in order to use such evidence to show the
defendant’s motive and intent.107 Even when prosecutors succeed
with these efforts, the focus of the trial must remain on the single
incident charged.108 All other context becomes a legal distraction.
Professor Tuerkheimer points out that the isolation of single
incidents also undermines the credibility of the victim’s testimo-
ny—frequently the only evidence in domestic violence cases.109 The
judge or jury faced with the story of a single moment of violence in
isolation will never understand the totality of the reign of terror.110
102. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 7, at 1004-05.
103. Stalking statutes are generally inapplicable to domestic violence cases, because a pros-
ecutor cannot bring stalking charges until after the victim has left the perpetrator. See id. at
1005-06. The concept of “unconsented contact” becomes far too blurry while the victim and
perpetrator still live together. See id. at 1010-11 (noting that the “law disregards the con-
tinuing course of conduct ... before the relationship is deemed to have ‘ended’”).
104. See id. at 985.
105. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b); Tuerkheimer, supra note 7, at 989-90.
106. See, e.g., United States v. Phillips, 599 F.2d 134, 136-37 (6th Cir. 1979) (reversing a
bank robbery conviction because the trial court erroneously allowed admission of evidence of
prior bank robberies).
107. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2). Upon request by the defendant, the prosecutor must give
notice before trial of her intent to use evidence of prior bad acts. Id.
108. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 7, at 994.
109. Id. at 981-84.
110. Id. at 983-88.
204 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:183
They will never understand how the victim found herself in the
situation, much less how she became trapped there.111 Further,
because existing law ignores the purposes of domestic violence
altogether, these stilted trials omit much of the evidence of the
defendant’s motive that would help to explain the crime.112
An industrious prosecutor might attempt to capture all of the
abuse by charging multiple counts of domestic violence—bringing a
single indictment listing twenty different crimes. The power of our
transactional notion of criminal law is such, however, that a judge
might sever those charges into different trials.113 The law requires
the evidence of each charge to stand alone and gives the court
discretion to avoid the potential of prejudice from overlapping
evidence.114
More to the point, police or prosecutors will rarely know about the
full scope of abuse precisely because the law requires them to focus
on an individual incident. A busy police officer responding to a
domestic violence call has no incentive to inquire about the broader
pattern of domestic violence,115 nor does the busy prosecutor triag-
ing the case as part of the always-enormous docket of domestic
violence cases.116 Most police and prosecutors will ask only about the
incident charged and may even become impatient with a victim who
veers off into a jumble of descriptions about the past.117
Even when charges are brought, criminal law seriously under-
estimates the harm caused by a batterer’s cumulative reign of
terror. The law charges the vast majority of domestic violence as
mere misdemeanors, punishable at best by a few months’ incarcera-
tion, but rarely giving any.118 Almost uniquely in the criminal justice
111. Id. at 986.
112. Id. at 986-87.
113. Id. at 973 n.71
114. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 14.
115. See Burke, supra note 12, at 577; Tuerkheimer, supra note 7, at 976.
116. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 7, at 977-79.
117. See id.
118. See Leigh Goodmark, Law Is the Answer? Do We Know That for Sure?: Questioning the
Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 7, 34 (2004)
(“Battered women ... frequently find their abusers punished by nothing more than pro-
bation.”); Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: The Crime and Punishment of Domestic
Violence, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1505, 1508 (1998) (discussing her frustration as a former
domestic violence prosecutor “with the unwillingness of judges to sentence domestic violence
offenders to incarceration”). In recognition of this issue, the federal law banning felons from
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system, we “punish” domestic violence with treatment in lieu of jail
time.119 Regardless of whether this treatment works (and the
evidence suggests it proves effective for only a small fraction of
batterers), there is no reason that it should entirely supplant pun-
ishment and deterrence.120
The failure of the law to capture the full pattern or seriousness of
domestic violence also results in a warped consideration of danger
during bail determinations. The judge deciding bail will know
nothing about the defendant’s threats to kill the victim if she
reports him, his years of escalating abuse, or his use of rape and
humiliation.121 Instead the judge will see only a single petty offense
and will likely grant the defendant’s bail. Despite the extraordinary
level of witness tampering and threats endemic to domestic violence
cases, the judge will not have access to the larger pattern necessary
to determine danger.122 Bail also depends heavily on the seriousness
of the charges brought, and most domestic violence will constitute
no more than a misdemeanor.123
possession of firearms dips down to include domestic violence misdemeanors as well. See 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2012).
119. See Hanna, supra note 118, at 1522 (“When prosecutors decide to go forward, the final
disposition is often a period of probation, either pre- or post-conviction, contingent upon
completion of a batterer treatment program.”).
120. See Leigh Goodmark, Achieving Batterer Accountability in the Child Protection System,
93 KY. L.J. 613, 644-46 (2004) (surveying research on batterer intervention programs). 
121. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 7, at 976-77.
122. See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 405-06 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice
Breyer noted that domestic violence cases are “notoriously susceptible to intimidation or
coercion of the victim to ensure that she does not testify at trial.” Id. at 406 (quoting Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 832-33 (2006)). Regardless of the batterer’s purpose, the use of
“threats, further violence, and ultimately murder can stop victims from testifying.” Id. at 405.
Justice Breyer then criticized the majority’s ruling that the forfeiture rule required a showing
of the batterer’s purpose in preventing the victim’s testimony as “grant[ing] the defendant not
fair treatment, but a windfall.” Id. at 406.
123. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28(f)(3) (“In setting, reducing or denying bail, the judge
or magistrate shall take into consideration the protection of the public, the safety of the
victim, the seriousness of the offense charged, the previous criminal record of the defendant,
and the probability of his or her appearing at the trial or hearing of the case.” (emphasis
added)); see also Goodmark, supra note 118, at 35 (noting that domestic violence cases are
“usually charged and tried as misdemeanors”). Indeed, a survey conducted across multiple
prosecutors’ offices in California, Oregon, and Washington found that 82 percent of domestic
violence cases were charged as misdemeanors. See Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After
Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747 app. at 822 (2005); see also EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 132 (3d ed. 2003) (“[E]ven if
accompanied by a night in jail, the minimal costs of arrest alone may sometimes actually
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A victim who has the courage to report her torturer thus faces his
almost immediate release.124 If the assistant district attorney meets
with her at all, it will be for the few precious minutes available for
a misdemeanor charge, with a prosecutor who will ask questions
only about the specific incident that led the victim to call for help.125
In return for all of that risk, the victim knows that—at best—her
abuser will face a mere misdemeanor conviction and a class on how
to not beat women any more.126 Even if convicted, and that is a big
“if,” the torturer will return home enraged and seeking revenge.127
The criminal justice system does not respond to the inability of
victims to testify by expanding sentences for domestic violence to
keep them safer when they do come forward.128 Instead, prosecutors
focus on forcing reluctant victims to testify, sometimes by jailing
them for contempt.129 This creates a situation in which victims
calling the police face a terrible choice between protecting them-
selves and risking jail for doing so.130
The decision to punish most domestic violence only as misde-
meanors also undermines the attention paid to the national
epidemic of domestic violence. Police and prosecutors give mis-
demeanor domestic violence less attention and fewer resources,
often shuttling the cases through special misdemeanor courts.131 Nor
serve as a reinforcement of the crime’s benefits. In jurisdictions without a comprehensive
strategy for domestic violence intervention, offenders will rapidly learn that there are no
further sanctions imposed beyond the arrest itself.”).
124. See supra note 118-19 and accompanying text.
125. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 7, at 977-87.
126. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
127. See Hanna, supra note 118, at 1555.
128. See id.
129. See Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1851 (1996). Prosecutors act with the best
intentions to remove the power of witness tampering from defendants by forcing the case
forward regardless. See id. at 1852. The problem is that a conviction that results in little
chance of punishment seems hardly worth putting the victim in that kind of danger.
130. See id.
131. See Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Low-
er Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 280-82 (2011) (explaining that most criminal
cases are misdemeanors, which receive far fewer resources from both prosecutors and public
defenders). Conversely, some jurisdictions have created special domestic violence courts,
though these matter much more if they receive more resources than other cases, not fewer.
See NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRI-
BLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 21-22 (2009); Rekha Mirchandani,
What’s So Special About Specialized Courts? The State and Social Change in Salt Lake City’s
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does domestic violence count in the policy tradeoffs made by mayors
and police chiefs.132 One political fact that does not receive scholarly
attention is that the FBI does not count misdemeanor vio-
lence—including the vast majority of domestic violence—in its
statistics on violent crime.133 So, cities concerned about the public
rise and fall of their violent crime rates need not concern themselves
with domestic violence until some of those cases result in murder
and register in the annual homicide rate. Community pressure
pushes all the actors within the criminal justice system to focus on
felony arrests, prosecutions, and convictions, thus excluding do-
mestic violence (and for that matter, most violent crime).134
The line between misdemeanor and felony violence makes sense
in the context of stranger and acquaintance violence, but not in the
context of domestic violence.135 The defendant charged in the bar
fight must face felony counts if he caused “serious bodily injury” or
if he used a weapon.136 Both factors represent increased dangerous-
ness and harm. Yet, as described above, batterers focus more on
control through pain than injury in and of itself.137 Although the
definitions of “serious bodily injury” in state law sometimes include
a notion of serious pain, the pragmatic focus usually remains on
lasting physical injury.138 Batterers also use violence in a way that
Domestic Violence Court, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 379, 379-80 (2005); John R. Emshwiller & Gary
Fields, Justice Is Swift as Petty Crimes Clog Courts, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 30, 2014), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/justice-is-swift-as-petty-crimes-clog-courts-1417404782 [https://perma.
cc/TXE4-YKHC]. Misdemeanor courts in a few states, including New York, even make use of
nonlawyer judges. See William Glaberson, In Tiny Courts of New York, Abuses of Law and
Power, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2006, at A1, A18.
132. See Buzawa et al., supra note 85, at 459-60.
133. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT,
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2013 at 1 (2014), https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-
the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/violent-crime/violent-crime-topic-page/violentcrimemain_
final [https://perma.cc/CHG9-3SHU] (“[V]iolent crime is composed of four offenses: murder
and nonnegligent manslaughter, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.”).
134. See generally Ellis, supra note 85, at 60-61 (discussing how the public interest affects
prosecutorial charging decisions).
135. See Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 150 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Since
that time, however, the term ‘felony’ has come to mean any offense punishable by a lengthy
term of imprisonment (commonly more than one year); the term ‘misdemeanor’ has been
reserved for minor offenses.” (internal citations omitted)).
136. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1980).
137. See supra Part I.
138. See Burke, supra note 12, at 583 (discussing how batterers frequently stop short of
committing felony violence because they focus more on control than on causing serious injury). 
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maximizes psychological torment and the deprivation of liberty
more than visible injuries.139
B. Most Torture Techniques Remain Legal
I would add to the analysis of Professors Burke and Tuerkheimer
the fact that many of the torture techniques described in Part I re-
main entirely legal under current criminal law.140 For example,
sleep deprivation violates no law, even when done for the purpose
of causing extreme pain or anguish.141 Torturers can make use of
sexual humiliation legally, so long as they do not commit an un-
consented touching of the victim’s genitals.142 Torturers can coerce
victims into degrading sexual acts while still meeting the legal
definition of consent under rape law.143
States even vary in how thoroughly they cover threats of violence.
The law often punishes only explicit threats, not the kind of implied
threats batterers frequently employ.144 Nor does every state outlaw
139. See id. at 569-70. Some of batterers’ favorite techniques remain in the misdemeanor
category, particularly strangulation (though many states have specifically decided to make
it a felony). As of September 2014, seven states have a strangulation-specific felony statute.
See NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, CRIMINAL STRANGULATION/IMPEDING BREATHING 4 (2014),
http://www.ndaajustice.org/pdf/strangulation_statutory_compilation_11_7_2014.pdf [https://
perma.cc/XDH8-G9SW].
140. Both of them note that “emotional abuse” falls outside of the scope of the law. See
Burke, supra note 12, at 596 (“[E]motional abuse ... is not itself criminal.”); Tuerkheimer,
supra note 7, at 1030 (discussing the “[l]aw’s failure to redress the ... non-physical
manifestations of the abuser’s effort to dominate his victim”).
141. The Department of Justice maintains that sleep deprivation of up to 180 hours does
not even violate the federal torture statute, though that statute is overly narrow and the DOJ
interpretation arguably wrong. See Luban & Shue, supra note 41, at 831-32; Mark Mazetti
& Scott Shane, Interrogation Memos Detail Harsh Tactics by the C.I.A., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/us/politics/17detain.html?hp [https://perma.cc/
2ZXC-JLAX].
142. Rape law, at best sexual battery, remains focused on physical contact, such as
“touch[ing] an intimate part of another person while that person is unlawfully restrained.”
CAL. PENAL CODE § 243.4 (West 2016).
143. Coercive sex remains lawful in most states, and even the few states that have
outlawed coercion have done so indirectly, by providing that it serves to negate consent. See
Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 39, 124 (1998). For
example, Florida’s sexual battery statute provides that “‘[c]onsent’ ... does not include coerced
submission.” FLA. STAT. § 794.011 (2016).
144. Most assault statutes require a threat to accompany an “immediate intention coupled
with a present ability to commit a battery.” 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assault and Battery § 1 (2008).
Courts also frequently require more explicit threats before issuing civil protection orders, such
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threats against others, such as threatening to kill the victim’s loved
ones.145 And some states still struggle with conditional threats, such
as “I will kill you if you leave me.” Courts have dismissed condi-
tional threats, for example, because they violated an imminence
requirement,146 though perhaps they would be covered under ex-
tortion statutes.147
Let me give an example of how poorly criminal law functions
against domestic violence, making use of a rarely examined type of
evidence in legal scholarship, the trial transcript of an acquittal.148
On March 28, 2010, seventy-eight-year-old Alfred Andrews rolled
into a New Orleans criminal court in a wheelchair, seeming weak
as threats that present an immediate danger or even threats to kill. See Catherine F. Klein
& Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State
Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 860-61 (1993).
145. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 144, at 860.
146. See, e.g., People v. Wilson, 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d 542, 555 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding that
conditional threats must convey “a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of execution”);
City of Cincinnati v. Baarlaer, 685 N.E.2d 836, 840-41 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (requiring the
victim to be placed in imminent harm before a conditional threat constitutes domestic
violence). But see, e.g., People v. Melhado, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 878, 883-84 (Ct. App. 1998)
(focusing on the use of the word “so” in the statutory language requiring a terroristic threat
be “so unconditional” and finding that conditional threats may suffice, so long as the context
conveys a “degree of seriousness and imminence” to the victim of the “future prospect of the
threat being carried out”); State v. Thompson, 580 S.E.2d 9, 14 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (finding
that conditional threats are unlawful if they make a reasonable person, and the victim in fact,
believe that the threat is likely to be carried out). The Supreme Court itself has noted that the
conditional nature of a statement diminishes its status as a true threat worthy of exception
to free speech protections. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969). Watts,
however, involved political speech and the conditional nature of the threat helped determine
its hyperbolic nature. See id. During its last term, the Supreme Court declined an opportunity
to measure the limits of threat law against the First Amendment in a domestic violence case.
See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012 (2015). The Court did hold, however, that
the federal interstate threat statute does require a showing of intent that the defendant
“transmit[ted] a communication for the purpose of issuing a threat, or with knowledge that
the communication will be viewed as a threat.” Id.
147. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 836.05 (2016).
148. Legal research focuses instead on conviction appeals, thus missing real, qualitative
analysis of trials, but also missing all criminal acquittals—the cases in which equal protection
violations are often most apparent. See generally Tania Tetlow, Discriminatory Acquittal, 18
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 75 (2009) (discussing the danger of juries engaging in discriminatory
acquittals in domestic violence cases). Scholars generally do not examine trial transcripts in
acquittals for the understandable reason that they are not created unless someone pays to
order them. The trial transcript discussed in this section was sent to me by local journalists
seeking comment and was ultimately posted online. See Transcript of Testimony, State v.
Andrews, No. 490-177 (La. Crim. Dist. Ct. Dec. 21, 2009), http://www.media.nola.com/crime_
impact/other/andrews.transcript.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YUF-EQT5].
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and frail, and complaining about diabetes.149 Andrews faced trial for
a misdemeanor charge of domestic violence battery.150 His thirty-
one-year-old wife, Jennifer Muse, testified that, on the night in
question, Andrews shoved her, causing her to fall and hit a pile of
books and cut her face.151 Andrews testified in turn that his wife
started the fight and he had simply defended himself.152
The entire incident seemed petty, and the Commissioner hearing
the case found him not guilty.153 She acknowledged the ways that
Andrews mistreated his wife but then characterized it as provoca-
tion: “Ms. Muse was probably right for not wanting to be awakened,
she was weary and tired, but that’s a part of the consequence, she
married someone fifty years, forty years ... her senior. And, so that’s
one of the consequences.”154 The Commissioner assumed an equal
power balance between the two and given the narrow scope of the
trial, heard no obvious evidence to the contrary.
Two days after his acquittal, Alfred Andrews shot and killed his
wife, her sister, and her mother before turning the gun on himself.155
A neighbor interviewed on the local news described watching Muse’s
mother die on the porch.156 She bled to death as the SWAT team
determined whether Andrews was still a threat.157
The trial transcript is remarkable for what it does not cover. It
necessarily focuses on a single, seemingly minimal incident of vi-
olence, with no reference to a history of abuse. Yet some facts,
chillingly relevant in hindsight, did sneak in through the testimony
of Muse. She described being woken regularly by Andrews in the
middle of the night even though he knew she had to leave for work
149. See Ramon Antonio Vargas, Treme Triple-Murder Suspect’s Poor Health a Factor in
Domestic Abuse Acquittal, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Mar. 31, 2010, 7:50 AM) http://www.nola.com/
crime/index.ssf/2010/03/treme_triple-murder_suspects_p.html [https://perma.cc/L5Q2-LSXE].
150. See Transcript of Testimony, supra note 148, at 2.
151. Id. at 4, 10.
152. Id. at 20-21.
153. See id. at 31.
154. See id.
155. See Vargas, supra note 149. Andrews was listed in critical condition and died in jail
a year later before facing trial for the triple murder. See John Simerman, New Domestic
Violence Initiative Follows Deadly Breakdowns in New Orleans, NEW ORLEANS ADVOC. (Oct.
25, 2014, 8:29 PM), http://www.theadvocate.com/sports/10622687-32/new-domestic-violence-
initiative-follows [https://perma.cc/MLA6-Y6WC].
156. See Vargas, supra note 149.
157. See id.
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at four o’clock in the morning.158 Andrews testified that he wanted
to finish an argument with his wife, but that she left the room.159 He
said, “I object to that,” and kept her from leaving.160 She then took
a stool to try to break the window and escape.161
Worst of all, no one did the math on their ages. Muse described a
relationship that spanned fifteen years, meaning that it began in
statutory rape when Muse was sixteen and Andrews sixty-three.162
According to later news reports, Andrews impregnated Muse while
he was dating and living with her mother and sister.163 For more
than a decade, he lived with all three women, sleeping with at least
two of them, before killing them all.164 There are many facts we will
never know about this case because existing law deemed them ir-
relevant, but it seems likely, based on the clues at trial and on his
ultimate killing spree, that Alfred Andrews ran a torture chamber
of his own. The structure of criminal law guaranteed that no one
bothered to find out.
III. A TORTURE STATUTE WOULD SOLVE MANY OF THESE LEGAL
PROBLEMS
Professors Burke and Tuerkheimer would solve the current gap-
ing holes in criminal law by broadening domestic violence statutes.
Their proposals would punish patterns of violence and recognize
158. See Transcript of Testimony, supra note 148, at 4, 9.
159. See id. at 20.
160. See id.
161. See id. 
162. See id. at 10 (relative ages of the parties); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:80 (2016) (felony carnal
knowledge).
163. See Vargas, supra note 149. Other reports described an aggravated rape charge filed
(and later withdrawn) against Andrews in 1996, charging him with raping a different girl
from age eleven to sixteen while he was dating her mother. See Man Who Killed 3 After
Domestic Violence Acquittal Labeled ‘Career Criminal,’ WWLTV.COM. (April 2, 2010),
https://perma.cc/UGZ8-47M6.
164. See Vargas, supra note 149.
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coercive control.165 I would focus instead on creating a torture
statute that is not specific to domestic violence for three reasons.
First, a ban on private torture should easily pass legislatures
without inspiring any organized opposition because no one publicly
supports torture by private actors.166 A torture statute closes gaps
in existing law in a variety of contexts of acknowledged horror. It
may not occur to legislators that the paradigmatic torturer in fact
lives down the street, attacking only the members of his household.
Instead, legislators can safely focus on drug kingpins, kidnappers,
165. Professor Tuerkheimer proposes the following statute: 
A person is guilty of battering when: 
He or she intentionally engages in a course of conduct directed at a family or
household member; and 
He or she knows or reasonably should know that such conduct is likely to result
in substantial power or control over the family or household member; and 
At least two acts comprising the course of conduct constitute a crime in this
jurisdiction.
Tuerkheimer, supra note 7, at 1019-20. Professor Burke proposes the following: “A person
commits the crime of Coercive Domestic Violence if the person attempts to gain power or
control over an intimate partner through a pattern of domestic violence.” Burke, supra note
12, at 601. Burke defines a “pattern of domestic violence” as “two or more incidents of assault,
harassment, menacing, kidnapping, or any sexual offense, or any attempts to commit such
offenses, committed against the same intimate partner.” Id. at 602 (footnote omitted).
166. The public increasingly does, however, tolerate torture by government actors seeking
out terrorists. See AMNESTY INT’L, STOP TORTURE GLOBAL SURVEY: ATTITUDES TO TORTURE 5
(2014), https://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/GlobalSurveyAttitudesToTorture2014.pdf [https://
perma.cc/L7SJ-74UT] (finding that 45 percent of Americans agree that torture is sometimes
“necessary and acceptable to gain information that may protect the public”); About Half See
CIA Interrogation Methods as Justified, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.
people-press.org/2014/12 /15 /about-half-see-cia-interrogation-methods-as-justified [https://
perma.cc/534B-358G] (finding that 51 percent of people believe the CIA methods detailed in
the Senate Intelligence Committee report were justified). Analysts blame this major shift in
opinion over time both on changing attitudes after 9/11, but mostly on positive cultural
depictions of torture, from the television show 24 to the movie about killing Osama bin Laden,
Zero Dark Thirty. See Sam Kamin, How the War on Terror May Affect Domestic Inter-
rogations: The 24 Effect, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 693, 703-08 (2007) (detailing cultural depictions of
torture, such as its effectiveness in obtaining truthful confessions, and expressing concern
that these depictions will desensitize the public and ultimately the courts); John Blosser, TV
Show 24 May Have Normalized Torture for Americans, NEWSMAX (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.
newsmax.com/US/normalized-torture-Jack-Bauer-24/2014/12/10/id/612274/ [https://perma.cc/
36M6-8KDJ]; Eric Deggans, Even If Torture Doesn’t Work in the Real World, TV Has Us
Convinced It Does, NPR (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/12/12/370264893/even-if-
torture-doesnt-work-in-the-real-world-tv-has-us-convinced [https://perma.cc/LT9L-Q8JY].
Despite the sad fact that Americans are becoming more inured to the horrors of torture when
they deem it justified, the analogy remains a powerful tool.
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or serial killers in training. This proposal does not require persuad-
ing legislators to give special status to domestic violence victims.
Indeed, in Michigan and California, the states that have already
passed general torture statutes, prosecutors have used their stat-
utes to capture other egregious harms, such as home invasions and
beatings of elderly victims,167 as well as cruel and sadistic rapes of
strangers.168 Notably, prosecutors have also used torture statutes to
capture the full pattern and horror of child abuse, another enormous
benefit of torture statutes that I do not address here.169 Finally,
prosecutors have also gone after gang members and drug dealers
who cruelly torture less sympathetic victims.170
Second, a torture statute can go farther than a “coercive domestic
violence” statute to cover conduct beyond battery and threats. While
both Professors Burke and Tuerkheimer acknowledge that violence
167. See, e.g., People v. Riley, Nos. 295838, 298164, 2011 WL 4501765, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App.
Sept. 29, 2011) (per curiam) (affirming defendant’s torture conviction for breaking into an
elderly man’s home, punching him in the face so hard his dentures came out, leaving a shoe
print on his face, tying him up, and beating him at length until he repeatedly lost conscious-
ness); People v. Lachniet, No. 297836, 2011 WL 2859818, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. July 19, 2011)
(per curiam) (affirming defendant’s torture conviction for breaking into an elderly woman’s
home, punching her repeatedly in the face until she lost consciousness, and tying her up with
cords).
168. See, e.g., People v. Massie, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 304, 308-09 (Ct. App. 2006) (upholding
defendant’s torture conviction after he raped a stranger in her home, reacted with rage when
she told him that Jesus loved him, used various methods to inflict pain, and acted over a long
period of time, taking breaks in between); People v. Pre, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 739, 740-42 (Ct. App.
2004) (holding that the torture conviction was supported by evidence that defendant selected
a woman unknown to him, forcibly entered into her apartment, attacked her viciously when
she resisted, twice choked her into unconsciousness, and then intentionally inflicted great
bodily injury and cruel and extreme pain by biting her while she was helpless and for no other
apparent purpose than revenge or sadistic pleasure).
169. See, e.g., People v. Lujan, 150 Cal. Rptr. 3d 727, 729-30 (Ct. App. 2012) (affirming
defendant’s conviction for torturing his children and murdering one of them after he beat
them repeatedly, fed them Tabasco sauce, and bit and shook them until one child died); People
v. Hill, No. 317294, 2014 WL 6602570, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2014) (per curiam)
(affirming defendant’s conviction for murder, torture, and child abuse after beating a two-
year-old to death for toilet training issues), appeal denied, 864 N.W.2d. 566 (Mich. 2015).
170. See, e.g., People v. Jung, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5, 6-7 (Ct. App. 1999) (finding sufficient
evidence to support a torture conviction when defendant intended to cause cruel or extreme
pain and suffering to a rival gang member during beating  episode lasting several hours, even
though victim suffered no broken bones or damage to vital organs; defendant and accomplices
burned naked victim with cigarettes, hit, bit, and jumped on him, tattooed him repeatedly,
poured rubbing alcohol over his fresh wounds, and applied Ben-Gay ointment to his penis,
circumstances suggesting intent to cause severe pain and suffering).
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represents the tip of a much bigger iceberg of abuse, they under-
standably do not attempt to stretch their proposed broader domestic
violence statutes to explicitly cover conduct not already crimi-
nalized.171 Torture statutes, including those already in place and
described in Part IV, could capture far more misconduct without
generating as much controversy.
Finally, the torture analogy accomplishes something profound to
help the criminal justice system and the public understand the true
nature of domestic violence.172 When we conceive of torture, we
understand things that elude us as to domestic violence. We do not
blame the victim or assume she is weak. We comprehend that vio-
lence is but one tool of many, and that the torturer’s ultimate goal
is power.
A. Using a Torture Statute to Capture the Full Horror of Domestic
Violence
I grapple with the specifics of a torture statute and the many
problems of line drawing in Part IV, but first let me describe my
general goals. A crime of torture would capture all of a batterer’s
physical violence and threats, tethering together discrete incidents
into a full picture of the pattern of terrifying abuse. It would allow
a prosecutor to describe a list of activities spanning a period of
time, with specific examples, and without separating each individ-
ual act into a de minimis separate count. The statute would also
allow for admission of the full evidence of abuse without resort to
narrow Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) exceptions.
Unlike most violent crime charges, torture would constitute a
felony with sentences commensurate with the defendant’s infliction
of horror. Courts would no longer equate an egregious, repeated
pattern of violence completed for the purpose of controlling another
human being with a mere bar fight. The focus would shift to the
defendant’s intent to inflict severe pain and psychological scars,
rather than whether the defendant caused actual physical injury.
171. Burke, supra note 12, at 601-05; Tuerkheimer, supra note 7, at 1020 (proposed statute
focuses on a “course of conduct” consisting of existing criminal violations).
172. See infra Part III.B.
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The statute would force the justice system to look at the full span
of evidence necessary to punish the defendant’s wrongdoing and to
better protect victims from murder. A charge of torture could reach
back farther than the statute of limitations to cover the sum total of
abuse, as conspiracy law currently allows.173 It would allow appro-
priate charges against a batterer who engaged in torture spanning
decades.
A torture statute would encourage police and prosecutors to seek
the victim’s full testimony about abuse, because, for the first time,
the full story would prove legally relevant. By listing the less ob-
vious torture techniques, the statute would map out the right
questions to ask victims to understand the totality of abuse. As a
result, law enforcement would delve into the complexity necessary
to explain the motives of both defendant and victim, and to make
those motives comprehensible at trial.
A torture statute also would encourage everyone in the criminal
justice system to better assess the risk that domestic violence will
result in murder. Almost uniquely among murder victims, domestic
violence victims often approach the criminal justice system for help
multiple times before ending up dead.174 A system that focuses only
on the latest discrete battery will miss the signals of impending
homicide, which are measured more by the batterer’s degree of
control over his victim than by his previous violence against her.175
A torture statute would encourage police, prosecutors, and even the
judge setting bail, to ask the right questions for a “lethality assess-
ment.”176
173. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 714, 717 (2013) (statute of limitations only
begins to run at the end of a conspiracy, or when a particular defendant withdraws from the
conspiracy).
174. See Jaime Adame, Are Domestic Violence Homicides Preventable?, CRIME REP. (Feb.
24, 2014), http://www.thecrimereport.org/news/inside-criminal-justice/2014-02-are-domestic-
violence-homicides-preventable [https://perma.cc/V76E-RQB8].
175. Stark, supra note 22, at 20.
176. Jacquelyn Campbell worked backwards from thousands of domestic violence homicides
to identify the biggest correlative factors. Her “Danger Assessment” uses a scoring system to
prioritize the riskiest behaviors:
1. Has the physical violence increased in frequency during the past year?
2. Has the physical violence increased in severity during the past year and/or
has a weapon or threat with a weapon been used?
3. Does he ever try to choke you?
4. Is there a gun in the house?
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A torture charge could include the techniques not currently ban-
ned by the law, including psychological torture, sexual humiliation,
and sleep deprivation. Rather than isolate a single, often minor,
incident in a way that makes the victim’s behavior seem entirely
counterintuitive, a torture trial would explain all of the ways the
batterer trapped her. The judge or jury would finally hear the de-
tails of a victim stuck, because she was sleep-deprived, isolated from
family and friends, and threatened with violence against her
children.
A prosecutor would have far more discretion to use an expert in
a torture trial in order to explain the nature and harm of the abuse.
At present, courts allow use of such experts primarily to explain a
victim who has recanted her testimony or failed to appear.177 Courts
are leery, however, of admitting expert testimony in a domestic
violence trial in which the victim actually testifies and cooperates.178
After all, there is no need to explain the concept of an act of battery
to a jury, and such evidence risks being offered merely to bolster the
5. Has he ever forced you into sex when you did not wish to have sex?
6. Does he use drugs? (By drugs, I mean “uppers” or amphetamines, speed, angel
dust, cocaine, crack, street drugs, heroin, or mixtures.)
7. Does he threaten to kill you and/or do you believe he is capable of killing you?
8. Is he drunk every day or almost every day? (in terms of quantity of alcohol)
9. Does he control most or all of your daily activities? (For instance, does he tell
you whom you can be friends with, how much money you can take with you
shopping, or when you can take the car?) (If he tries but you do not let him,
check here ____)
10. Have you ever been beaten by him while you were pregnant? (If never
pregnant by him, check here ____)
11. Is he violently and constantly jealous of you? (For instance, does he say, “If
I can’t have you, no one can.”)
12. Have you ever threatened or tried to commit suicide?
13. Has he ever threatened or tried to commit suicide?
14. Is he violent toward your children?
15. Is he violent outside the home?
Jacquelyn C. Campbell, Prediction of Homicide of and by Battered Women, in ASSESSING DAN-
GEROUSNESS: VIOLENCE BY SEXUAL OFFENDERS, BATTERERS, AND CHILD ABUSERS 96, 105
(Jacquelyn C. Campbell ed., 1995).
177. See, e.g., Arcoren v. United States, 929 F.2d 1235, 1239-41 (8th Cir. 1991) (affirming
district court’s admission of expert testimony on battered women’s syndrome designed to
explain victim’s recanted testimony). 
178. See, e.g., People v. Christel, 537 N.W.2d 194, 201-05 (Mich. 1995) (finding the admis-
sion of expert testimony on battered women’s syndrome to be error, albeit harmless, when
victim did not recant or fail to appear).
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victim’s credibility.179 In a torture trial, however, the prosecutor
could legitimately use an expert to explain the harm that torture
techniques create.180 As I explain in the next section, the victim’s
physical and mental pain and suffering will be an element of the
offense.181
A torture statute would make a long pattern of misdemeanor
conduct finally add up to a serious felony. Torture would capture the
full harm that batterer behavior causes to the victim and the com-
munity. And, a torture charge would create far more bargaining
power for a prosecutor to exact a plea.182
Imagine if in the trial of Alfred Andrews the prosecutor could
have brought a charge of torture that covered years of whatever
violence Andrews had committed against his wife, her mother, and
her sister.183 First, the police officer responding to the incident
would have been more likely to ask questions about past history and
current danger. The officer might have discovered more evidence to
predict the fact that the innocuous looking old man would soon com-
mit a triple homicide. The prosecutor, in turn, might have spent the
time necessary to determine whether she could bring a felony count
by asking even more questions about the history of the relationship,
the use of other torture techniques, and the degree of the defen-
dant’s control over his victim.
A felony charge of torture against Andrews would then have been
acknowledged by the entire criminal justice system as worthy of
resources. At the bond hearing, a felony charge would make clear
179. See id.; see also State v. Borelli, 629 A.2d 1105, 1115 n.15 (Conn. 1993) (“Expert
testimony on the subject of battered woman’s syndrome is not relevant unless there is some
evidentiary foundation that a party or witness to the case is a battered woman, and that party
or witness has behaved in such a manner that the jury would be aided by expert testimony
providing an explanation for the behavior.”).
180. See, e.g., People v. Studier, No. 317351, 2015 WL 447408, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb.
3, 2015) (per curiam) (affirming admission of expert testimony in a torture case explaining a
domestic violence victim’s sense of danger that prevented her from fleeing, though also finding
the expert’s testimony that domestic violence victims rarely fabricate allegations as harmless
error given overwhelming physical evidence), rev’d in part, denied in part on other grounds,
871 N.W.2d 524 (2015).
181. See infra Part IV.B.
182. See, e.g., People v. Morgan, No. 315467, 2014 WL 2881073, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. June
24, 2014) (per curiam) (affirming sentence of defendant who agreed to plead to assault with
intent to do great bodily harm for dismissal of the torture charge).
183. See supra Part II.B.
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the seriousness of the offense. A torture charge would help demon-
strate the defendant’s motive of controlling and owning his wife and
her family; it would have covered his psychological torture and sleep
deprivation along with the physical violence.184 As such, it would
have provided more clues about the risk of witness tampering and
intimidation to the judge considering bail. In a jurisdiction with
resources for witness safety, the prosecutor might have encouraged
and provided help for the victim to hide.
A torture trial against Andrews would have presented the full
picture of the defendant’s actions based on evidence now deemed
relevant and admissible. That evidence would have provided the
jury with a better understanding of the victim’s situation and thus
her credibility. It probably would have described a lifetime of control
over Muse, her mother, and her sister, enforced through some com-
bination of violence, threats, sleep deprivation, and years of sexual
abuse. Compare that possibility to the scant evidence actually pre-
sented to the court of a single pathetic shove.185
Because of this broader context, Andrews’ trial under a torture
statute might have resulted in his conviction, instead of the ac-
quittal that emboldened him to take revenge against the wife who
dared testify against him.186 More to the point, a torture statute
would have offered more than the possibility of a mere misdemeanor
conviction and a resulting slap on the wrist. A felony conviction of
torture, making clear the sum total of what Andrews did to his
family for years, might have resulted in actual jail time. Further, it
might have kept Jennifer Muse, her mother, and her sister alive.
B. Changing the Cultural Perception of Domestic Violence
Those who have debated for years about how best to describe
“domestic” or “intimate partner” “violence” or “abuse,” understand
184. At the least, the prosecutor would have known to ask about all of these facts. See
Tuerkheimer, supra note 7, at 977.
185. See supra notes 149-54, 158-62 and accompanying text.
186. Although conviction rates in domestic violence trials are not well documented, some
empirical evidence suggests that few offenders are convicted under the current system. See
Hanna, supra note 118, at 1517-19; Virginia E. Hench, When Less Is More—Can Reducing
Penalties Reduce Household Violence?, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 37, 40-41 (1997).
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that labels matter.187 In years of training police, prosecutors,
lawyers, judges, and the public, I find that describing domestic
violence as torture, an argument that several domestic violence
scholars have made, works better than any other to help explain the
dynamics of abuse.188 For the reasons detailed in this section, the
torture analogy cuts through many of our cultural misunderstand-
ings and our diminishment of domestic violence. It puts the focus
back on the perpetrator instead of the victim. It reminds us that
violence is but one tool of many and that the worst scars are
psychological.
Current cultural attitudes acknowledge domestic violence as a
clear wrong but also subject it to disdain and contempt.189 The public
187. See, e.g., Dutton, supra note 15, at 1196 (urging expert testimony on “battered
women’s experiences” rather than “battered woman syndrome” in order to better explain the
diverse reactions victims have to trauma); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered
Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 69 (1991) (arguing for the use
of the term “separation assault” to better explain the difficulty of leaving and answer the age-
old question of why victims stay); Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered
Woman Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 985-86 (1995) (arguing for the use
of the term “coercive control” to better express the nature of abuse).
188. See supra note 15.
189. I teach a class on domestic violence and the law and assign students to research
cultural attitudes toward domestic violence so that they will understand what they are up
against in courtrooms clearly influenced by those attitudes. Students have come to class with
examples ranging from country music to rap. See, e.g., Toby Keith, A Little Too Late, YOUTUBE
(June 16, 2009), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nOd2NuHgwew [https://perma.cc/76T4-
GZVY] (making light of a man purportedly laying bricks to entomb a terrified woman tied to
a chair); Eminem, Kim, YOUTUBE (Oct. 14, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z_
6lgDFX6y0 [https://perma.cc/T67Z-JKR4] (rapping about his fantasy of killing his real life ex-
wife complete with mimicking her screams). Eminem also has a duo with famous domestic
violence victim Rihanna that features him singing about love driving him to violence and her
singing the chorus “Just going to stand there and watch me burn / But, that’s alright because
I like the way it hurts / Just gonna stand there and hear me cry / But that’s alright because
I love the way you lie.” See Eminem ft. Rihanna, Love the Way You Lie, YOUTUBE (Aug. 15,
2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uelHwf8o7_U [https://perma.cc/7UF9-Q3WH].
Family Guy does its usual excellent job of mocking and revealing attitudes towards the sub-
ject. See Nando Di Fino, Funny or Die? Family Guy’s Domestic Abuse Episode Raises Questions
of Taste and Appropriateness, MEDIAITE (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.mediaite.com/tv/funny-or-
die-family-guys-domestic-abuse-plot-line-raises-questions-of-taste-and-appropriateness/
[https://perma.cc/4BDF-L63A]. Some of the most disturbing images are those aimed at child-
ren and teenagers. For example, in Disney’s Beauty and the Beast, Belle is terrified by a
physically menacing and utterly cruel Beast before she proudly sings of having transformed
him. See Rachelle Schmidt, Local Panel Examines Domestic Violence in Popular Culture,
PORTLAND ST. VANGUARD (Oct. 22, 2013), http://psuvanguard.com/local-panel-examines-
domestic-violence-in-popular-culture/ [https://perma.cc/5CQC-KG68]. The Twilight movies
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exaggerates the expansion of rights for women and thus believes
that women stay in abusive relationships only by choice, not ne-
cessity.190 To those who imagine that calling 9-1-1 will result in
instant safety, domestic violence victims who stay seem masochistic
or insane.191 The public entirely overestimates the ability of victims
to escape threats of murder, economic ruin, public shaming, and lost
custody of children.192 In contrast, Americans do not ask themselves
why abused Pakistani women “stay” because they understand that
these women have nowhere to turn.193
The concept of torture focuses on the culpability of the defendant
and distracts us from our absurd cultural fixation on blaming
victims of domestic violence.194 Almost uniquely among crimes, we
blame women for the domestic violence (and rape) committed
against them.195 We stereotype them as provocative and deserving
of violence or as masochistic and thus enjoying and choosing it; we
require that victims seem appropriately meek and pathetic and
punish them if they seem too strong.196 These hurdles, above all else,
make the prosecution of domestic violence exceedingly difficult.197
mirror this message, romanticizing stalking, obsessive jealousy, and ultimately sexual vio-
lence on the couple’s honeymoon night for which the heroine immediately forgives her new
husband. See Wind Goodfriend, Relationship Violence in Twilight, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Nov. 9,
2011), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/psychologist-the-movies/201111/relationship-
violence-in-twilight [https://perma.cc/7NMH-THSJ].
190. See Buel, supra note 83, at 297.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See Leti Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1181, 1189
(2012) (noting that Americans blame domestic violence in immigrant communities and third
world countries on the perpetrators’ “culture,” while simultaneously ignoring the role of
American culture on America’s shameful rates of domestic violence murders).
194. Similarly, this is part of the efforts of Professors Burke and Tuerkheimer in their
proposals for a broader domestic violence statute. See Burke, supra note 12, at 582;
Tuerkheimer, supra note 7, at 986-87.
195. See Burke, supra note 12, at 580.
196. See Paula Finley Mangum, Note, Reconceptualizing Battered Woman Syndrome
Evidence: Prosecution Use of Expert Testimony on Battering, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 593,
615-16 (1999) (“Jurors may expect victims and batterers to fit certain stereotypes and may
have certain expectations regarding a battered woman’s behavior in a battering situation....
Expert testimony identifying the dynamics of domestic violence and the patterns of behavior
in battering relationships is relevant ... [and] particularly important for evaluating [the
victim’s] credibility.”).
197. See Hanna, supra note 118, at 1508. 
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Our cultural paradigm of torture, however, does not blame or
even focus on the victim. Our images of torture involve strong
victims such as soldiers or terrorist suspects. Few would blame
John McCain for crumbling under torture in a Vietnamese POW
camp and denouncing his nation.198 We understand that the
techniques of torture work on anyone, regardless of their physical
and psychological strength. Few of us harbor any illusion that we
could sustain our dignity under torture for very long.
Describing domestic violence as premeditated torture also cor-
rects the cultural excuses we make for batterers. We stereotype
them as flailing victims of their own hapless tempers, frustrated
rather than cruel, emotional rather than cold-blooded.199 We be-
lieve that batterers merely lash out at the closest victim out of
pent-up emotion and therefore see domestic violence as more of a
social problem than a violent crime.200 Almost uniquely in the crim-
inal justice system, we “punish” it with mere treatment.201
Torture, in contrast, invokes clear criminal culpability. Whether
a torturer seeks information, compliance, or punishment, torture
constitutes cruelly and chillingly premeditated behavior.202
198. See Adam Chandler, This Is How a Prisoner of War Feels About Torture, ATLANTIC
(Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/12/John-Mccain-Speech-
Senate-Republican-CIA-Torture-Report/383589/ [https://perma.cc/F45H-UPPV] (describing
McCain’s opposition to the use of torture and his description on the Senate floor of his five-
and-a-half-year ordeal).
199. The television show Family Guy, for example, was criticized for a harsh depiction of
domestic violence in which the characters made fun of the victim, saying things like “she’s
gotten a lot better” as a result of the abuse she has endured, and “let’s hope she’s good at
talking because we know she doesn’t listen so good.” Family Guy: Screams of Silence: The
Story of Brenda Q (Fox television broadcast Oct. 30, 2011); see Whitney Jefferson, Family Guy
Hits Horrible New Low with Domestic Abuse Episode, JEZEBEL (Oct. 31, 2011), http://jezebel.
com/5854810/family-guy-hits-horrible-new-lows-with-domestic-abuse-episode [https://perma.
cc/5SGX-XQ6A]. Another episode of Family Guy portrays a character hearing graphic
domestic abuse from a neighboring apartment, including the abuser saying “You think I want
to hurt you?” and “You make me hurt you!” while the woman cries, and responding by saying
“I’m sure there’s two sides to this.” Family Guy: Love, Blactually (Fox television broadcast
Sept. 28, 2008).
200. See DAVID ADAMS, WHY DO THEY KILL? MEN WHO MURDER THEIR INTIMATE PARTNERS
23-24 (2007) (describing myths about men who batter).
201. See Goodmark, supra note 120, at 643-44.
202. See Reyes, supra note 26, at 591; see also Copelon, supra note 5, at 327 (“‘Battering,
whether or not it is premeditated, is purposeful behavior’ and ‘should be seen as an attempt
to bring about a desired state of affairs.’ Battered women report that men often plan their
attack ... [and often have] excellent impulse control in other contexts.” (footnotes omitted)
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Batterers use torture because it gives them power.203 They do not
torture accidentally or because they are frustrated at work; they do
so because it gives them control over another human being.204
Understanding that basic fact would fundamentally change how we
perceive and punish the crime.
The public also understands torture to be serious—a violation of
fundamental human rights. Even in a culture steeped in violence as
entertainment, torture garners attention.205 Popular culture is
awash with descriptions of torture in fiction and in news reports,
portraying both the experiences of our own soldiers in POW camps
during every war, and, sadly, our own government’s use of tor-
ture.206
Domestic violence, meanwhile, remains a petty crime in the pop-
ular imagination—a bleak and inevitable social problem that makes
(first quoting SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE 17 (1982); then quoting R.
EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSELL DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES: A CASE AGAINST THE
PATRIARCHY 24 (1979)).
203. See Cohen, supra note 15, at 768 (framing the battering relationship as an ongoing
regime of private tyranny); Fischer et al., supra note 27, at 2126, (describing the context of
rulemaking and dominance); Mahoney, supra note 187, at 34 (“Feminist activists writing
about heterosexual battering have ... defined power and control, rather than incidents of vio-
lence, as the heart of the question.”); Joan S. Meier, Notes from the Underground: Integrating
Psychological and Legal Perspectives on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1295, 1317 (1993) (observing “a growing emphasis in the literature and
community on understanding battering not as violence, per se, but rather, as a larger pattern
of dominance and control”); Joan Erskine, Note, If It Quacks like a Duck: Recharacterizing
Domestic Violence as Criminal Coercion, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1207, 1216 (1999) (asserting that
need for control motivates domestic violence).
204. Batterers come in different forms, some more closely resembling the stereotypes. For
example, Donald Dutton characterizes the different types of batterers as family only batterers
(who can be quite charming and functional in daily life and terrorists at home), sociopaths
(who act in entirely cold-blooded cruelty for sport), and borderline batterers (who struggle
with substance abuse and with their tempers and who act in escalating desperation). DONALD
DUTTON WITH SUSAN K. GOLANT, THE BATTERER: A PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE 23, 26, 29 (1995).
This last category involves the kind of dysfunction we project onto the group as a whole.
205. Sadly, this is perhaps why we have so many cultural representations of torture—the
need to ratchet up depictions of violence to impress viewers increasingly inured to them. See
John Hayes, Films and TV Up the Ante on Graphic Torture Scenes, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE (Jan. 19, 2007), http://www.post-gazette.com/ae/movies/2007/01/19/Films-and-TV-up-
the-ante-on-graphic-torture-scenes/stories/200701190242 [https://perma.cc/NM27-9G3B];
Maura Moynihan, Torture Chic: Why Is the Media Glorifying Inhumane, Sadistic Behavior?,
ALTERNET (Feb. 2, 2009), http://www.alternet.org/story/124739/torture_chic%3A_why_is_the_
media_glorifying_inhumane,_sadistic_behavior [https://perma.cc/8527-PGWS].
206. See Hayes, supra note 205; Moynihan, supra note 205.
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national news only when committed against or by celebrities.207
Understanding domestic violence as torture would clarify that it
constitutes more than the sum total of hits and shoves. As Evan
Stark argues, the core injury of domestic violence is the deprivation
of liberty.208 Domestic violence “seeks to take away the victim’s
liberty or freedom, to strip away their sense of self. It is not just
women’s bodily integrity which is violated but also their human
rights.”209 A felony crime of torture, by its very name, signals a
premeditated, cruel, and heinous crime.
The torture description also provides an entirely comprehensive
summary of the methods of domestic violence. As described in Part
I, batterers use the full array of torture techniques, from sporadic
violence designed to control, to the creative use of threats against
the victim and everyone she cares about, sleep deprivation and
psychological torment.210 In the context of domestic violence, these
patterns seem counterintuitive and de minimis—a batterer who
merely wakes up his wife, who insults her, who hits her only occa-
sionally and without great force, and who spews seemingly empty
207. Compare the coverage of Ray Rice or Chris Brown with the countless murders that
make only local news under headlines like, “Volatile Relationship Goes Bad.” Compare Ken
Belson & Steve Eder, In Ray Rice Case, N.F.L. Chose Not to Ask Many Questions, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/09/sports/mueller-report-nfl-did-not-see-ray-
rice-video-before-it-suspended-him.html [https://perma.cc/3ZGA-F534], and Times Topic:
Chris Brown, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/topic/person/chris-brown [https://perma.cc/
6DSJ-BHX8] (long list of articles about Chris Brown and domestic violence in New York
Times), with Jennifer Portman, Mysterious Death Reveals Volatile Relationship, TALLAHASSEE
DEMOCRAT (Mar. 1, 2015), http://www.news4jax.com/news/local/mysterious-death-reveals-
volatile-relationship [https://perma.cc/9DXV-8R2B]. Even celebrity headlines can be co-opted
by other subjects. Tapes released by Mel Gibson’s former girlfriend captured him essentially
admitting to hitting his own baby while attempting to punch the child’s mother and threat-
ening to bury the mother under the rosebushes, but what made headlines about the tapes was
his use of racist language. See, e.g., Jewel Samad, Controversial Character: Mel Gibson, L.A.
TIMES, http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/gossip/la-et-controversy-mel-gibson-l598k8nc-
photo.html [https://perma.cc/V6JG-25F9].
208. Stark, supra note 22, at 4. Those who work with survivors frequently use the “power
and control” wheel developed in Duluth, Minnesota, as a way to discuss this aspect of do-
mestic violence. Power and Control Wheel, NAT’L CTR. ON DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE,
http://www.ncdsv.org/images/powercontrolwheelnoshading.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZEK6-6VSK].
It describes the ubiquitous forms of control, none of which actually involve violence. Id.
209. What is Coercive Control?, CEDAR NETWORK, http://www.cedarnetwork.org.uk/about/
supporting-recovery/what-is-domestic-abuse/what-is-coercive-control/ [https://perma.cc/QP7S-
NFCG] (citing Evan Stark).
210. See supra Part I.
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threats. In self-defense cases—the cases in which the victims are al-
lowed to describe their entire experiences—we see how short current
law falls when applied within the context of our paradigm of do-
mestic violence.211
In the context of torture, however, the public imagination un-
derstands that the infliction of violence is merely one of many
effective techniques to break the spirit.212 Sporadic violence, while
giving the victim some illusion of control, works better than con-
stant violence.213 Threatening the victim, or better yet, threatening
his loved ones, can work even better than the reality of violence.214
Sleep deprivation, or other physical efforts to unnerve and confuse
the victim, work as well as the infliction of pain.215
The concept of torture also helps to explain the brutality of sexual
violence and humiliation. While the law does criminalize rape
within marriage, actors within the criminal justice system fail to
understand that the harm of rape is not made easier by previously
consensual sex, but instead is magnified by being attacked by
someone the victim loved and trusted.216 Our culture tends to equate
rape with theft of sex, rather than violence and degradation.217 If
rape is merely theft, then marital rape does not involve more than
211. See Jody Armour, Just Deserts: Narrative, Perspective, Choice, and Blame, 57 U. PITT.
L. REV. 525, 527-28 (1996); V.F. Nourse, Self-Defense and Subjectivity, 68 U. CHI. L. REV.
1235, 1247-48 (2001).
212. Unfortunately much of the public education on this subject has involved techniques
used by the U.S. government against prisoners at Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib. See Luban
& Shue, supra note 41, at 835.
213. See, e.g., ZERO DARK THIRTY (Sony Pictures 2012) (depicting CIA agents utilizing the
phrase “when you lie to me, I hurt you” to portray to the detainee that the level of torture he
endured was within his control—he would then either be rewarded for his cooperation or
punished for his insubordination).
214. See, e.g., Homeland: Blind Spot (Showtime television broadcast Oct. 30, 2011)
(depicting the CIA questioning terrorist operative and threatening the safety of the man’s
family to persuade him to cooperate); 24: Day 2, 7:00 p.m.-8:00 p.m. (Fox television broadcast
Feb. 11, 2003) (depicting agents threatening to kill a terrorist’s wife and two children, and
ultimately even staging a mock execution of one child, in order to coerce the suspect to
cooperate).
215. See ZERO DARK THIRTY, supra note 213.
216. See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Slutwalking in the Shadow of the Law, 98 MINN. L. REV.
1453, 1453 (2014) (citing NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, THE NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY:
2010 SUMMARY REPORT 18 (2011) (noting that one in five women in the U.S. will be raped in
her lifetime, and of those, half are raped by an intimate partner).
217. See id. at 1456, 1456 n.10.
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the overruling of a frigid wife too tired to satisfy her husband.218
Indeed, until quite recently, the law gave husbands that preroga-
tive.219
We understand, however, that sexual degradation constitutes a
powerful tool of torture, perhaps the most powerful. At the U.S.
detainment center in Abu Ghraib, the media reported that never-
released pictures showed soldiers raping male and female prisoners,
sometimes with objects.220 Reports also indicated that children
were raped in front of their parents.221 Photographs actually re-
leased showed acts of sexual humiliation against prisoners including
photographs of prisoners who were forced to create a naked human
pyramid or wear women’s underwear.222 In the context of that sear-
ing national embarrassment, the public came to understand rape
and sexual humiliation as forms of torture that cause lasting psy-
chological wounds.
That brings us to another insight of the torture analogy—that
psychological wounds matter just as much, or more, than physical
injury. In the context of domestic violence, the public thinks little
218. See, e.g., Rescue Me: Satisfaction (Fox Network television broadcast, July 18, 2006)
(portraying a marital rape as harmless); see also Scott Collins, Dennis Leary Doesn’t Care if
You’re Angry, L.A. TIMES (June 12, 2007), http://www.articles.latimes.com/2007/jun/12/
entertainment/et-channel12 [https://perma.cc/8Y7T-W3NR] (describing the outrage caused
by the Rescue Me marital rape scene).
219. See Klarfeld, supra note 45, at 1819.
220. See Duncan Gardham & Paul Cruickshank, Abu Ghraib Abuse Photos ‘Show Rape,’
TELEGRAPH (London) (May 27, 2009), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
northamerica/usa/5395830/Abu-Ghraib-abuse-photos-show-rape.html [https://perma.cc/SQH7-
ZJQ2]; Luke Harding, Focus Shifts to Jail Abuse of Women, GUARDIAN (London) (May 11,
2004), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/may/12/iraq.usa [https://perma.cc/L4WM-
KEX2]; Daniel Tencer, Journalist: Women Raped at Abu Ghraib Were Later ‘Honor Killed,’
RAW STORY (Sept. 11, 2010), http://www.rawstory.com/2010/09/women-abu-ghraib-honor-
killed/ [https://perma.cc/5LJ5-2JG5].
221. See Scott Higham & Joe Stephens, New Details of Prison Abuse Emerge, WASH. POST
(May 21, 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A43783-2004May20.html
[https://perma.cc/TZ2U-UX9S]; Geraldine Sealey, Hersh: Children Sodomized at Abu Ghraib,
On Tape, SALON (July 15, 2004), http://www.salon.com/2004/07/15/hersh_7/ [https://perma.
cc/XTP2-532J].
222. See Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, NEW YORKER (May 10, 2004), http://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/05/10/torture-at-abu-ghraib [https://perma.cc/WLV4-
HLNG]; Bill Redeker, Former Iraqi Prisoners Recount Abuse, ABC NEWS (May 3, 2004), http://
www.abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=131663 [https://perma.cc/84XQ-47E5]. To view some of
the released photos, see Abu Ghraib Abuse Photos, ANTIWAR.COM (Feb. 17, 2006), http://www.
antiwar.com/news/?articleid=8560 [https://perma.cc/KF6N-5J2J].
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of the concept of “emotional abuse”; it equates “emotional abuse”
with being called fat too many times, which results in mere low self-
esteem.223 We dismiss the premeditated cruelty of a batterer as the
careless insults of a thoughtless spouse. And, we fail to acknowledge
the profound harm of sleep deprivation in domestic violence cases
at all.
Our culture better understands the concept of psychological
torture. Soldiers at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay used psy-
chological torture techniques, because these techniques proved
effective to break prisoners and skirted the edges of legality.224 Both
in our fictionalized versions of torture and our reporting on the real
thing, we acknowledge the damage done. The experience forever
robs the victim of sleep, implanting permanent nightmares and
creating psychological wounds that distort the personality and ruin
lives.225 Because our paradigmatic torture victim is male, not fe-
male, we spare him the minimization of his psychological harm.226
Finally, our cultural references to torture occasionally even help
to explain some of the most counterintuitive aspects of psychological
warfare. Torturers intersperse cruelty with kindness.227 They find
223. For example, take note of how the characters in Family Guy treat the daughter, Meg
Griffin: her emotional and sometimes physical abuse is made out to be a joke and is not
portrayed as harmful. See Meg Griffin, WIKIA, http://www.familyguy.wikia.com/wiki/Meg_
Griffin [https://perma.cc/7TF7-4LZ6] (describing all the instances of abuse Meg has suffered
throughout the episodes and how she feels about herself, particularly about her weight).
224. See Luban & Shue, supra note 41, at 833-34; Paul Sperry, U.S. Losing ‘Hearts, Minds,’
Despite Sensitivity Training, WORLDNETDAILY (Apr. 2, 2004), http://www.wnd.com/2004/
04/24006/ [https://perma.cc/M6SA-UUPE] (describing other tactics that were used, including
“pride-and-ego down” techniques, which attack the prisoners’ sense of self-worth to make
them more willing to cooperate).
225. Perhaps the best recent example of this in fictional portrayal is the show Homeland,
which portrays the return of an American soldier, whom terrorists captured and held for
years. See Homeland: Pilot (Fox 21 Television Studios television broadcast Oct. 2, 2011). The
show depicts Sergeant Brody’s inability to sleep, difficulty being intimate with his wife and
close to his children, moments of reliving his trauma, flashes of anger, and inappropriate
behavior. See Homeland: Grace (Fox 21 Television Studios television broadcast Oct. 9, 2011).
226. See George Simon, Minimization: Trivializing Behavior as a Manipulation Tactic,
COUNSELLING RESOURCE (Feb. 23, 2009), http://www.counsellingresource.com/features/2009/
02/23/minimization-manipulation-tactic/ [https://perma.cc/43D5-J448] (discussing process by
which men attempt to convince women that the wrongful things they do are not really
harmful, making women feel as though they have overreacted).
227. See, e.g., ZERO DARK THIRTY, supra note 213 (rewarding detainee for his cooperation
by speaking to him softly and politely, providing him water, or allowing him to go outside to
eat a full meal and have a cigarette).
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ways to persuade the victim to bond with them. For example, the
tortured POW in the television series Homeland described with
great shame the reasons he became loyal, and even “loved,” his
terrorist persecutor.228 After years of isolation and physical and
psychological torture, his captor then offered him kindness and
connection.229 This insight becomes crucial to understanding do-
mestic violence and the counterintuitive aspects of remaining
emotional attachment.
The biggest disconnect in the analogy between torture and
domestic violence is the absence of captivity in most domestic
violence. Even so, the public has a slightly better understanding of
the ways that a torture victim can feel trapped even when the door
remains open. We understand that a torturer can exercise total
control over a victim without constant vigilance.230 Effective torture
inspires a terror so total, a sense of utter omnipotence, that victims
do not believe they have an avenue of escape.231
If the criminal justice system actually prosecuted domestic vio-
lence crimes as torture, it would send powerful signals both within
the system and beyond it. A torture crime would help police, pros-
ecutors, and judges understand the seemingly counterintuitive
dynamics of the problem. It would also help translate the issue for
those who serve on juries deciding the fate of both defendants and
victims.
Most of all, prosecuting domestic violence as torture would help
the public as a whole to better understand domestic violence. The
228. Homeland: The Weekend (Fox 21 Television Studios television broadcast Nov. 13,
2011).
229. Id. (“He offered me comfort. And I took it ... I was broken, living in the dark for years,
and a man walked in and he was kind to me. And I loved him.”). For a critique of the glorifica-
tion of torture in Homeland see, for example, Alyssa Rosenberg, The Critique of Torture that
Mass Culture Can’t Make, WASH . POST  (Dec. 10, 2014), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/act-four/wp/2014/12/10/the-critique-of-torture-that-mass-culture-
cant-make/ [https://perma.cc/45BE-ZN5T].
230. See, e.g., Game of Thrones: The Gift (HBO television broadcast May 24, 2015) (showing
that a torture victim was given an avenue of escape by helping another victim, the wife of the
torturer, but chose to turn her in to his torturer instead).
231. See, e.g., Daniel Schwartz, Profiling Abductors: Q&A with Brad Garrett, CBC NEWS
(June 23, 2011), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/profiling-abductors-q-a-with-brad-garrett-
1.999522 [https://perma.cc/2AMV-J7RT] (describing why kidnap victims sometimes fail to
escape when given the chance and using the example of Jaycee Dugard, who was kidnapped
as a child and held hostage in the kidnapper’s back yard for eighteen years).
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countries around the world with the lowest rates of intimate partner
violence are those with cultures that thoroughly condemn it and
shame the perpetrator instead of the victim.232 The legal system can
accomplish little compared to the enormous power of culture, par-
ticularly to root out deeply seeded violence in the home.233 But the
legal system can act as an important cultural signal of what we
prioritize and what we condemn.
The criminal justice system’s signaling role is perhaps its most
important. Consider how the anti-drunk driving movement suc-
ceeded at fundamentally shifting cultural opinion not only with
public service announcements, but also with tough laws that sig-
naled an end to the tolerance of the behavior.234 The mere presence
of the penalties sent an important signal of deterrence and of the
shamefulness of the conduct.235 Thus, it would matter enormously
to the public understanding of domestic violence if the criminal
justice system declared it to be torture.
IV. DRAFTING A TORTURE STATUTE
We may know torture when we see it, but it remains hard to
define. A torture statute must be broad and general enough to cap-
ture the cruel creativity of torturers and the full range of their
techniques. Yet, as occurred with the criminalization of stalking, a
torture statute may be prone to charges of vagueness as it attempts
to criminalize true terrorism while excluding innocuous conduct.236
232. Cf. WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO MULTI-COUNTRY STUDY ON WOMEN’S HEALTH AND
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: SUMMARY REPORT OF INITIAL RESULTS ON PREVALENCE,
HEALTH OUTCOMES AND WOMEN’S RESPONSES 5 (2005) (connecting rates of domestic violence
around the world to cultural attitudes towards domestic violence).
233. See id. at 22.
234. See James C. Fell & Robert B. Voas, Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD): The
First 25 Years, PAC. INST. RES. & EVALUATION 195, 195 (2006), http://www.documents.jdsupra.
com/2a7743e0-ea80-41d8-9739-efb8cf57928b.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2YX-GVG9] (describing
the successful grassroots efforts of Mothers Against Drunk Driving, which have helped reduce
alcohol-related traffic deaths from an estimated 30,000 in 1980 to 16,694 in 2004).
235. See id. at 203.
236. See Jennifer L. Bradfield, Note, Anti-Stalking Laws: Do They Adequately Protect
Stalking Victims?, 21 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 229, 233 (1998) (critiquing the effectiveness of the
anti-stalking laws); Laurie Salame, Note, A National Survey of Stalking Laws: A Legislative
Trend Comes to the Aid of Domestic Violence Victims and Others, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 67,
68-69 (1993) (discussing the development of anti-stalking legislation and constitutional issues
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Members of our own government famously quibbled about the
actions necessary to constitute torture, arguing, for example, that
waterboarding did not count.237 Torturers everywhere have taken
advantage of any existing loopholes, prioritizing pain over injury
and psychological scars over physical ones.238 A torture statute can-
not allow torture techniques to evade existing rules, nor can it apply
too broadly and risk losing its rhetorical power.
The drafting of a torture statute also requires deciding how
broadly the law can capture abuse without weakening the impact
that the word “torture” should bring to domestic violence. It requires
deciding whether the definition of torture should include specific
examples of techniques. Must torture constitute a pattern of be-
havior, or can it be based on a single act? Should psychological
torture suffice, or should violence be a necessary component? To
grapple with these questions, we first will compare the statute I pro-
pose with international law, federal law, and the laws of two states
that have experimented with private torture statutes.
A. Existing Torture Law
International law, federal law, and the state statutes in Cali-
fornia and Michigan make different attempts to define the conduct
necessary to rise to the level of torture.
The Convention Against Torture creates the broadest application,
limited only by the requirement that torture be done for a broad set
of purposes by a state actor.239 International law does not require
it potentially raises).
237. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), http://
www.nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.08.01.pdf  [https://perma.cc/8L77-TQMM].
238. See id.
239. The Convention Against Torture (CAT) includes:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a
third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third
person has committed ... or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for
any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity.
CAT, supra note 1, art. 1 (emphasis added). CAT contains a broad definition of torture, which
I make use of, but also requires a purpose, an element that I reject for the reasons discussed
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physical violence, much less physical injury; nor does it require that
the victim be in the custody or control of the perpetrator.240 Once
stripped of the state action requirement, as I propose, this statutory
language would include all of the torturous conduct previously
described.241 Although CAT captures a torturer who uses every tech-
nique, even in the absence of violence, its purpose requirement,
discussed in more detail below, does not particularly fit domestic
violence.
At the other extreme, California requires the actual infliction of
“great bodily injury,” though it also states that it does not require
proof of pain.242 This requirement restricts the application of the
torture statute to cases involving felony levels of injury and, thus,
would accomplish far less than this Article attempts. Like interna-
tional law, California requires a purpose for torture but includes a
broader list: “revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any sadistic
purpose.”243 Arguably, a batterer would meet the purpose require-
ment if his torture counted as “persuasion.”244
Occupying the middle ground, U.S. federal law, which Michigan
essentially copied, punishes violence that causes severe physical
suffering, without requiring the “great bodily injury” of California
law.245 This would cover a pattern of domestic violence not resulting
below. By its nature, CAT also applies only to state action. See id. (applying only when pain
or suffering is inflicted by or with the involvement of a public official).
240. See id.
241. See supra Part I.
242. California requires serious physical violence: 
Every person who, with the intent to cause cruel or extreme pain and suffering
for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any sadistic purpose,
inflicts great bodily injury as defined in Section 12022.7 upon the person of
another, is guilty of torture.
The crime of torture does not require any proof that the victim suffered pain.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 206 (West 2016). (emphasis added). California returns to the “purpose”
requirement contained in international law. California defines “great bodily injury” as “a
significant or substantial physical injury,” in its sentence enhancements. See PENAL
§ 12022.7(f).
243. PENAL § 206.
244. See PENAL § 206
245. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2012), and MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.85 (2016), with PENAL
§ 206. The federal law also outlaws torture by state actors, defined as: “an act committed by
a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental
pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another
person within his custody or physical control.” 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (emphasis added). The federal
statute mirrors international law in defining the requisite intent to torture broadly. See CAT,
2016] CRIMINALIZING “PRIVATE” TORTURE 231
in serious injury, ranging from slaps to punches. Like federal law,
Michigan law does not actually require physical violence.246 Both
laws punish the intentional infliction of “severe mental pain or
suffering.”247 The disjunctive “pain or suffering” serves the purpose
of avoiding any argument over the difference between the two.248
Sleep deprivation, for example, can cause incredible suffering but
not necessarily pain.249 Although both statutes would cover the
torture techniques beyond physical violence described in Part I,
each then creates serious limits in their definition sections.250
In the context of domestic violence, these statutes would punish
only a narrow category of torture techniques beyond violence. They
would ban only specific threats of imminent death or other serious
violence against the victim or another and would seem to not cover
implied or more vague threats. It leaves nebulous the legality of
sleep deprivation, famously approved by the Department of Justice
for regular use in Guantanamo.251 These laws also do not forbid
other methods of psychological torture, from denigration to mind
games and sexual humiliation.
supra note 1, art 1. But it adds a requirement, one I also reject in my proposal, requiring
physical control over the victim. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340. The statute goes on to limit the possible
definition of “severe mental pain or suffering,” by creating a very limited demonstrative list
of its causes. See id.
246. The Michigan statute defines torture this way:
A person who, with the intent to cause cruel or extreme physical or mental pain
and suffering, inflicts great bodily injury or severe mental pain or suffering upon
another person within his or her custody or physical control commits torture and
is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for life or any term of years.
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.85(1).
247. Id.
248. See Luban and Shue, supra note 41, at 828.
249. See id. (“[O]f course forms of physical suffering exist that aren’t pain: freezing cold,
unbearable heat, itching, nausea, paralysis, aching all over, inability to breathe—all are
suffering; none are pain.”).
250. In both statutes, “mental pain or suffering” must be caused by a restrictive list of
activities: (1) the intentional infliction of either “severe physical pain or suffering” (in federal
law) or more narrowly “great bodily injury” (in Michigan law); (2) the use or threatened use
of mind-altering drugs (not particularly relevant to domestic violence); (3) the threat “of
imminent death” or other violence (in federal law, the threat of “severe physical pain or
suffering,” and in Michigan law, the threat of “great bodily injury”), thus excluding less ex-
plicit threats; or (4) the threat that another person will be subjected to each of the categories
above. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340(2); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.85(2)(d).
251. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, supra note 237, at 13, 28-29.
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The Michigan statute’s requirement that the victim be within the
perpetrator’s “custody or physical control” is also limiting for do-
mestic violence purposes.252 Batterers sometimes kidnap and lock
up their victims, but, generally, they use far more indirect methods
of isolation and control.253 A torture statute aimed at domestic
violence could not include a kidnapping requirement.
All of these statutes fail to fully protect victims of domestic
violence. Both California254 and Michigan255 have used their torture
252. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.85. There are domestic violence cases that include such overt
kidnapping, but those cases are more rare. See, e.g., People v. Studier, No. 317351, 2015 WL
447408, at *1, *7 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2015) (per curiam) (ruling that defendant met the
“custody and control” provision of the statute because he kicked in the victim’s door and
assaulted her all night, and rejecting the defendant’s arguments that the victim could have
left before or after the attack), rev’d in part, denied in part on other grounds, 871 N.W.2d 524
(Mich. 2015).
253. See supra Part I.
254. See, e.g., People v. Alvarez, No. F066511, 2014 WL 5409070, at *1-2 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct.
24, 2014) (affirming defendant’s conviction of torture for beating his girlfriend repeatedly with
his hands, feet, a shoe rack, and aluminum bat); People v. McCoy, 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d 382, 386,
388 (Ct. App. 2013) (affirming defendant’s conviction of torture for folding his girlfriend’s legs
backwards over her head, breaking her back and leaving her a quadriplegic, shoving batteries
in her rectum, and smearing feces on her face); People v. Hamlin, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 402, 411-13
(Ct. App. 2009) (affirming defendant’s conviction of torturing his wife and sentence of life in
prison for a long history of physical abuse, including strangulation, threats with guns and a
sword, hitting her with a taser, hitting her injured wrist with a metal pipe, and threatening
to kill her unless she falsely confessed to molesting their children); People v. Burton, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 334, 336-37 (Ct. App. 2006) (affirming defendant’s conviction of torture of the mother
of his children for permanently disfiguring her face with four deep cuts in the presence of their
young sons); People v. Baker, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 313, 315-16 (Ct. App. 2002) (affirming
defendant’s torture conviction for pouring gasoline over his wife and setting her on fire);
People v. Hale, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 904, 908-09 (Ct. App. 1999) (affirming defendant’s torture
conviction when he entered the victim’s bedroom at night, while the victim slept beside her
three-year-old daughter, and struck victim twice in the face with a ball peen hammer, crack-
ing a number of her teeth, splitting her lip, and cutting her under the eye, and then stayed
and hid in the room to observe victim’s pain and terror); People v. Healy, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 274,
277 (Ct. App. 1993) (affirming defendant’s torture conviction when he told the victim she
never had any real hardship in her life and that “he needed to create some hardship” to get
her to listen to him and proceeded to beat the victim unprovoked, warning the victim not to
make any noise during beatings for fear a neighbor would call police).
255. See, e.g., Studier, 2015 WL 447408, at *1 (affirming defendant’s torture conviction
based on an attack against his estranged wife, whom he had abused for years, in which he
kicked open her door and assaulted her until dawn, striking her in the face, kicking her in the
groin, choking her, threatening her with a steak knife, calling her a whore, and blaming her
for the attack); People v. Hinton, No. 308019, 2013 WL 514870, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 12,
2013) (per curiam) (affirming defendant’s torture conviction when he committed sexual as-
sault against his victim, peed in her mouth, made her put a beer bottle in her vagina, whipped
her with a cord while naked, tied her to the bed, and gagged her while he left the house);
2016] CRIMINALIZING “PRIVATE” TORTURE 233
statutes frequently in domestic violence cases, but, given the strict
requirements of their laws, those prosecutions have focused on cases
involving extreme and sometimes lurid facts. As a result, a new
statute that will apply more broadly must be created.
B. Proposed Torture Statute
My draft of a torture statute includes some easy choices, like
omitting a state action requirement and a “custody or control” re-
quirement. Other choices remain much closer, like the decision to
include at least one act of violence while criminalizing a much
broader spectrum of torture techniques. To resolve the deficiencies
of existing statutes, this Article proposes the following statute:
Any person who knowingly inflicts severe physical or mental
pain or suffering upon another, through a pattern of torture
techniques including at least one crime of violence, is guilty of
torture. Torture techniques include, but are not limited to: phys-
ical violence, threats of violence to the victim or to the victims’
family members or loved ones, sleep deprivation, sexual violence
or humiliation, or psychological torture.
“Crime of violence” should be defined to include simple battery, so
that the torture statute will capture a broad range of domestic
violence. It should also include kidnapping, because psychological
abuse alone should rise to the level of torture when conducted upon
a kidnapping victim. “Psychological torture” should be defined, with
reference to the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress,256
People v. Hoover, No. 308115, 2013 WL 45647, at *1, *4-5 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 3, 2013) (per
curiam) (affirming defendant’s torture conviction after he broke into his ex-girlfriend’s home,
grabbed her and forcibly exposed her breast to his friends, choked her, and threatened to kill
her and slash her car tires; and holding that the evidence presented was sufficient to show
“severe mental pain or suffering” by the victim, even in the absence of great bodily injury);
People v. Schaw, 791 N.W.2d 743, 744 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam) (affirming
defendant’s torture conviction after he choked, restrained, threatened to kill, attempted to
drug, and held a knife to the neck of his ex-wife); People v. Green, No. 279519, 2009 WL
349749, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2009) (per curiam) (affirming defendant’s torture
conviction when he struck the victim with his fist multiple times in the face and the vagina,
forced an ammunition clip down the victim’s throat and into her anus, and heated knife blades
and held them against the victim’s thigh).
256. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). As background on
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as “the use of extreme and outrageous conduct to intentionally cause
severe emotional distress.” Finally “pattern” should be defined as
two or more torture techniques, or one technique that results in se-
rious bodily injury.
The statute (1) removes a state action requirement in order to
apply to private torture; (2) includes a requirement of at least some
physical violence, threat of violence, or kidnapping to avoid con-
troversy and the dilution of the concept of felony torture; (3)
provides that once that threshold requirement is met, the full range
of torture techniques are illegal and clearly relevant at trial; (4)
adds a pattern requirement made necessary by broad line drawing;
(5) removes the “custody and control” requirement as too narrow in
the context of domestic violence; and (6) removes a purpose require-
ment as both redundant given the conduct involved and difficult to
prove in the abstract. The choices involved in each of these elements
are explained below.
1. Removing the State Action Requirement
First and foremost, a private torture statute must drop any state
action requirement. The common definition of “torture” refers to the
technique rather than to its use by state actors.257 Michigan and
California, as previously discussed, have already passed private
torture statutes of general application seemingly without contro-
versy.258 Numerous states use torture as an aggravating factor in
murder cases.259 Several other states also use torture in their child
definitions of psychological torture, see Reyes, supra note 26, at 594-95.
257. See, e.g., Torture, Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/
torture [https://perma.cc/2HYB-XGMQ] (“[T]he act of causing severe physical pain as a form
of punishment or as a way to force someone to do or say something; something that causes
mental or physical suffering: a very painful or unpleasant experience.”); Torture, OXFORD DIC-
TIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/torture [https://
perma.cc/X2U9-V3JJ] (“The action or practice of inflicting severe pain on someone as a
punishment or to force them to do or say something, or for the pleasure of the person inflicting
the pain.”).
258. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 206 (West 2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.85 (2016).
259. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(a)(3) (2016); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-604(8) (2015);
see also Christopher G. Browne, Note, Tortured Prosecuting: Closing the Gap in Virginia’s
Criminal Code by Adding a Torture Statute, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 269, 274-75 (2014)
(discussing the inclusion of torture as an aggravating factor for murder and capital pun-
ishment).
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abuse statutes.260 And, several states have “sexual torture” statutes
that cover crimes like rape with objects.261
 Outlawing torture committed by private actors does nothing to
weaken the special condemnation of state-sponsored torture.
Torture committed by state actors is particularly terrible and
worthy of special attention, but all torture is abhorrent and worthy
of criminalization. Nor does the focus of international and federal
law on state-sponsored torture make that focus mandatory. As a
practical matter, neither body of law could have general jurisdiction
over private torture.262
Focusing the public on the abhorrence of torture in general
might actually help remind the public that the state is not justified
in making use of torture. To an extraordinary degree after the Sep-
tember 11 attacks, the American public’s resistance to the state’s
use of torture to capture terrorists eroded in the face of government
arguments about its necessity to remain safe in a dangerous
world.263 Popular culture, from the television show 24 to the film
Zero Dark Thirty, reifies this effect through dramatized stories
justifying torture by government officials.264 When the public feels
vulnerable enough to rationalize torture, it also becomes tempted to
minimize the harm of torture.
In contrast, torture committed by private actors presents no
such cognitive dissonance. It epitomizes acknowledged evil and,
260. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-20 (2015); see also Browne, supra note 259, at 275
(discussing the inclusion of torture as an aggravating factor for child abuse).
261. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65.1 (2016) (banning “sexual torture” in order to include
rape with an inanimate object).
262. International law focuses on state action. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW II INTRO. NOTE (AM. LAW INST. 1987). Federal law requires a constitutional
basis to regulate private violence, either through the Commerce Clause or to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment, neither of which would seem to apply here. See United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (striking down portion of the Violence Against Women Act
that created a private right of action against gender-based violence, because it exceeded
Congress’s power). Regardless, the focus of international and federal law on state action has
nothing to do with the question of whether states should regulate nonstate action.
263. Recent polling shows that the American public has become increasingly inured to the
horrors of torture when done by the state to root out terrorism. See supra note 166.
264. See, e.g., M. Angela Buenaventura, Torture in the Living Room, 6 SEATTLE J. SOC.
JUST. 103, 116-25 (2007) (discussing the impact of the television show 24 on the public’s per-
ception of torture); Jane Mayer, Zero Conscience in Zero Dark Thirty, NEW YORKER (Dec. 14,
2012), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/zero-conscience-in-zero-dark-thirty [https://
perma.cc/2KZ7-HUG5].
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thus, reminds the public of torture’s cumulative harm. The public
can more clearly measure, for example, the degradation of psy-
chological abuse and the impact of sleep deprivation in the context
of a kidnapper than it can when justifying police interrogation
techniques.265 The public is unlikely to rationalize the horrors of
waterboarding conducted by criminals, though it proves surprising-
ly willing to do so when it seems necessary to locate terrorists.266
2. Defining Torture
The proposed statute would borrow language from the statutes
described above to define torture as the intentional infliction of
“severe physical or mental pain or suffering.”267 As with stalking
laws, the requirement of injury to the victim is both subjective—the
victim must actually be so injured—and objective—a reasonable
person would be so injured. The injury must rise to the level of
“severe” to qualify as torture. And, as explained immediately below,
it must involve a pattern including at least one act of violence.
This proposed statutory language would capture and criminalize
the full array of torture techniques. A nonexclusive list of these
techniques helps to clarify the types of nonviolent behavior the
statute means to address. I would include both the obvious—
violence and threats of violence—and the less obvious techniques
with particular resonance in domestic violence cases—sleep depri-
vation, sexual humiliation, and psychological torture. While even
nonexhaustive lists risk being treated as exhaustive, this list is
necessary to suggest to courts the types of techniques batterers and
other torturers use. In theory, the statute should still remain open
to punishing more creative methods of abuse.
a. Requiring at Least One Act of Violence
Labeling domestic violence as torture will have less impact if we
water down the definition of torture. Thus, the proposed statute
265. See, e.g., Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 229-30, 240 (1941) (deeming answers
given during a police interrogation voluntary, despite the testimony of use of sleep deprivation
and physical contact).
266. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
267. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1) (2012).
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creates a threshold requirement of a “crime of violence” before turn-
ing to the punishment of other torture techniques. Accordingly,
psychological abuse standing alone, no matter how painful, would
not meet the definition of torture.
The threshold requirement of violence is not overly high. The def-
inition would include simple battery and misdemeanor domestic
violence, a broader standard than the California torture statute’s
requirement of “great bodily injury.”268 At the same time, however,
the statute as a whole would clearly avoid inflating every petty
shove into torture. Standing alone, a shove would not rise to the
level of torture, unless other behavior causing the victim “severe
physical or mental pain or suffering” accompanied it.
I singled out kidnapping, which is usually considered a crime of
violence anyway,269 in my threshold requirement in order to capture
the kind of torture that occurs in nondomestic violence cases.
Sexually humiliating, degrading, and using mind games against
someone you have tied up in your basement meets the public
paradigm of torture without watering down its impact.
The threshold act of violence requirement purposefully excludes
the abuser who causes severe mental pain and suffering through
verbal cruelty, sleep deprivation, sexual humiliation, and emotional
degradation but never actually uses violence. This was not an easy
decision. There exist torture chambers operated through purely
psychological means, some of them quite dangerous.270 By its na-
ture, torture focuses on mental and emotional scars and permanent
changes to the personality.271 As some scholars of torture point out,
the line between physical and mental injury is inherently blurred
given the physiological reactions of the brain and body to trauma.272
Should we punish cruelty as torture? We have a growing trend of
punishing nonviolent behavior, because it causes serious emotional
268. CAL. PENAL CODE § 206 (West 2016).
269. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) (defining “crime of violence” as any felony containing
the use or threatened use of force against another). The commentary for the United States
Sentencing Commission Guidelines makes clear that this definition includes kidnapping. See 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015).
270. Luban & Shue, supra note 41, at 824.
271. See supra Part I.
272. Luban & Shue, supra note 41, at 830 (“[M]ental pain and suffering can cause physical
effects and, vice versa, that physical pain and suffering can cause mental effects—including
mental pain and suffering.”).
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suffering. Stalking statutes punish patterns of behavior that col-
lectively amount to implied threats.273 In the last few years, every
state has enacted an antibullying statute.274 These statutes punish
a course of conduct designed to psychologically abuse another.275
Antibullying statutes range from prohibitions on “creat[ing] a hos-
tile environment [and] ... disrupt[ing] the education process,”276 to
the causing of “psychological distress” through, among other things,
“teasing” or “social exclusion.”277 The statutes focus on the mental
pain bullying causes, whether that mental pain is caused by
physical violence, threats, or by purely psychological techniques.278
Forty-four states also prohibit hazing, using similar definitions of
patterns of sometimes purely psychological techniques against con-
senting victims.279
Broadening torture to include cruelty in the absence of violence
would resemble the criminalization of the tort of intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress (IIED).280 IIED allows civil damages for
“outrageous” behavior resulting in “extreme emotional distress.”281
273. See Ashley N.B. Beagle, Comment, Modern Stalking Laws: A Survey of State Anti-
Stalking Statutes Considering Modern Mediums and Constitutional Challenges, 14 CHAP. L.
REV. 457, 476 (2011).
274. See Deborah Temkin, All 50 States Now Have a Bullying Law. Now What?,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 27, 2015, 12:19 PM, updated June 27, 2015), http://www.huffington
post.com/deborah-temkin/all-50-states-now-have-a_b_7153114.html [https://perma. cc/M9CG-
C8WG].
275. Massachusetts, for example, defines “bullying” as follows:
[T]he repeated use by one or more students ... of a written, verbal or electronic
expression or a physical act or gesture or any combination thereof, directed at
a victim that: (i) causes physical or emotional harm to the victim or damage to
the victim’s property; (ii) places the victim in reasonable fear of harm to himself
or of damage to his property; (iii) creates a hostile environment at school for the
victim; (iv) infringes on the rights of the victim at school; or (v) materially and
substantially disrupts the education process or the orderly operation of a
school.... [B]ullying shall include cyber-bullying.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 370 (2016).
276. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-222d (2016).
277. FLA. STAT. § 1006.147(3)(a)(1)-(2) (2016).
278. See Claire Wright, Borrowing from the Torture Convention to Define Domestic Vio-
lence, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 457, 554 (2013).
279. See id. at 555. For a current list of antihazing statutes by state, see States with Anti-
Hazing Laws, STOP HAZING, http://www.stophazing.org/states-with-anti-hazing-laws/ [https://
perma.cc/FG7F-ZLTX].
280. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-1628 (West 2016).
281. See Merle H. Weiner, Domestic Violence and the Per Se Standard of Outrage, 54 MD.
L. REV. 183, 188 (1995) (“The success of suits for intentional infliction of emotional distress
2016] CRIMINALIZING “PRIVATE” TORTURE 239
In the context of marriage in particular, courts struggle, but have
managed, to find lines between mere meanness and “outrageous”
cruelty.282
I reject this path for several reasons. First, most potentially lethal
cases do, in fact, involve violence.283 Second, I cannot imagine that
prosecutors would charge even terrible cruelty as torture, unless it
involved at least some violence. Indeed, as I address below, it will
require serious effort to persuade prosecutors to make use of the
statute even in the most paradigmatic cases. Accordingly, there
would be little benefit to including a very broad definition, and it
might come at quite a cost. This Article attempts to create a felony
torture statute deemed serious, a law that will bring the most hor-
rendous of facts to light for the first time. Diluting the statute would
make it both more controversial to legislators and less influential
with the public.
b. Adding a Pattern Requirement
As another method to narrow the scope of the statute to a rec-
ognizable definition of torture, I also would require a minimum
pattern of conduct. A pattern requirement helps to distinguish
between true torture and more isolated and less horrific conduct. It
helps to prove both the intentionality and the impact of the defen-
dant’s behavior.284 For this reason, stalking, hazing, and bullying
statutes almost always make use of a pattern requirement in order
to limit their scope.285
I include a pattern requirement even though none of the existing
general torture statutes discussed do so. A pattern requirement
provides a limiting factor that better captures the repetitive nature
generally turns on the plaintiff’s ability to demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct was ‘out-
rageous.’”).
282. See id. at 188-89; see, e.g., id.; Hakkila v. Hakkila, 818 P.2d 1320, 1330-31 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1991) (holding that a husband’s insults to his wife over the course of their marriage were
insufficiently outrageous to establish liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
283. See Campbell, supra note 176, at 97; Jaquelyn C. Campbell et al., Risk Assessment for
Intimate Partner Violence, in CLINICAL ASSESSMENT OF DANGEROUSNESS 136, 137 (Georges-
Franck Pinard & Linda Pagani eds., 2000).
284. See Wright, supra note 278, at 518.
285. See id. For an analysis of each state’s stalking laws, see Criminal Stalking Laws,
STALKING RESOURCE CTR. (July 20, 2015), https://victimsofcrime.org/our-programs/ stalking-
resource-center/stalking-laws/criminal-stalking-laws-by-state [https://perma.cc/ R3N2-9JZG].
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of domestic violence.286 It replaces some of the other limiting factors
in those statutes that I have rejected, from “great bodily injury”287
to “custody or physical control” over the victim.288
A pattern requirement directs prosecutors to examine and prove
a history of abuse, rather than focus on the culminating act, as the
Michigan and California torture prosecutions have tended to do.289
When prosecutors present evidence of a pattern, moreover, they
should have little difficulty proving the defendant’s intent, as dis-
cussed below.290
In my proposal, this pattern requirement would be met with two
or more “torture techniques.” The proposal also leaves the door open
for a single egregious act resulting in “serious bodily harm” to cover
an extreme case: a defendant who sets his victim on fire, and
nothing else, would still be guilty of torture.291
3. Torture Should Require Specific Intent but Without a
Further Purpose Requirement
The crux of each of the existing torture statutes discussed here-
in rests on the defendant’s specific intent to inflict “severe,”292 or
“cruel or extreme,”293 “physical or mental pain or suffering.”294 The
286. For similar reasons, several child abuse torture statutes also include a pattern
requirement. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 726.6A (2016); State v. Crawford, 406 S.E.2d 579, 581
(N.C. 1991). 
287. CAL. PENAL CODE § 206 (West 2016).
288. 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2012).
289. See supra notes 254 and 255.
290. See People v. Hamlin, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 402, 455 (Ct. App. 2009) (affirming defendant’s
torture conviction based on a pattern of violence as itself proof of specific intent). The de-
fendant in that case also argued to no avail that the California torture statute precluded a
pattern of conduct adding up to torture, because the statute did not require a course of con-
duct. Id.
291. See, e.g., People v. Baker 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 313, 319 (Ct. App. 2002) (affirming
defendant’s torture conviction after he poured gasoline over his wife and set her on fire).
292. CAT, supra note 1, art. 1; 18 U.S.C. § 2340.
293. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.85(1) (2016); CAL. PENAL CODE § 206 (West 2016).
294. The federal torture statute requires “specific intent” in its statutory language. 18
U.S.C. § 2340. Michigan courts have interpreted its torture statute to require specific intent.
See People v. Galvan, Nos. 299814, 299822, 2013 WL 5338520, at *8 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 24,
2013) (per curiam) (“[D]efendant was charged with torture and first-degree child abuse. These
were specific intent crimes.”). California courts have similarly interpreted their own statutes.
See People v. Pearson, 266 P.3d 966, 980 (Cal. 2012) (“[T]his mental state element describes
a specific intent rather than general criminal intent.”).
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defendant must act with the purpose of causing the victim to suffer,
not with mere knowledge that pain will result.295
The proposed statute would incorporate this specific intent
requirement to avoid watering down the definition of torture. First,
a specific intent requirement distinguishes between a true torturer
and a dentist or surgeon. Surgeons act with the knowledge that they
cause pain but (hopefully) without the purpose of causing pain.296
Second, the intent requirement helps to distinguish between true
torture and ordinary violence by requiring that the infliction of pain
constitute more than an afterthought. A torturer commits violence
not just out of rage, but because he intends to make the victim
suffer.297 Along with the other proposed limiting factors, the specific
intent requirement helps to identify the requisite cruelty.
How would a prosecutor prove specific intent? Courts in Cali-
fornia and Michigan have upheld torture convictions when evidence
of the defendant’s callous disregard for suffering demonstrated spe-
cific intent.298 Prosecutors met this standard by providing evidence
of, for example, repeated beatings,299 or the severity of the victim’s
wounds.300
295. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962);
Oona Hathaway et al., Tortured Reasoning: The Intent to Torture Under International and
Domestic Law, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 791, 801 n.40 (2012) (“The Code ‘establishes four levels of
culpable criminal intent ranging, in order, from the most culpable to the least culpable level;
purposeful, knowing, reckless, and negligent.’” (quoting FRANK AUGUST SCHUBERT, CRIMINAL
LAW: THE BASICS 157 (2d ed. 2010))).
296. Luban & Shue, supra note 41, at 849. The author of the infamous “torture memo”
argued that the specific intent of the federal torture statute required that a torturer act with
the “precise objective” of causing pain, rather than the use of pain in order to extract
information. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, supra note 237, at 3. It is hard to imagine a
state court adopting such strained reasoning when applied to private torture.
297. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (defining torture as an act “specifically intended to inflict
severe physical or mental pain or suffering”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 206 (West 2016) (defining
a torturer as one who “inten[ds] to cause cruel or extreme pain and suffering”).
298. See supra Part III.
299. See, e.g., People v. Assad, 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 699, 706 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding that the
state met its burden of proving defendant acted with the intent to inflict cruel pain when he
repeatedly struck his son in regions of his body in which he had already suffered injuries);
People v. Misa, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 805, 809 (Ct. App. 2006) (upholding finding of specific intent
based on evidence that the defendant struck his victim in the head repeatedly over a sig-
nificant period of time and displayed callous indifference to the victim’s obvious need for
medical attention).
300. See People v. Burton, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 334, 337 (Ct. App. 2006) (ruling that “a jury
may consider the severity of the wounds in determining whether the defendant intended to
torture,” and rejecting defendant’s argument that he did not act with “intent to cause cruel
242 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:183
The violence committed by batterers involves an abundance of
evidence that the batterer intended to cause his victim to suffer.
As described in Part I, domestic violence involves a pattern of re-
peated activity, clearly demonstrating intent and premeditation.301
Batterers also use a variety of different techniques designed to find
new and creative ways to cause physical and mental pain.302 They
do not just demonstrate the callous disregard for their victims’ pain;
they work hard to cause suffering in creative and terrible ways.303
Although I would require specific intent to inflict “severe physical
or mental pain or suffering,” I would not go farther and require a
specified purpose or motive.304 The specific intent to cause pain
should suffice to distinguish torture from more mundane violence.
Indeed, neither the federal torture statute, nor the Michigan
statute, requires a particular purpose.305 And despite the purpose
requirement in international law, legal scholars have rarely focused
on that element, arguing instead that the government should not
engage in torture regardless of its purpose.306
Omitting a purpose requirement may seem counterintuitive—a
lost opportunity to focus on the batterer’s motive. I argued above
that one of the important insights that the torture label brings to an
understanding of domestic violence is the notion of a purpose be-
yond the loss of temper.307 Batterers act to control another human
being, to exert power.308 For that reason, Professor Tuerkheimer
or extreme pain and suffering” when he permanently disfigured the face of his ex-girlfriend
by cutting her deeply four times in the face in the presence of their children).
301. See supra Part I.
302. See supra Part I.
303. See supra Part I.
304. In contrast, international law lists the following requisite purposes, nonexclusively:
“obtaining from [the victim] or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for
an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intim-
idating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind.” CAT, supra note 1, art 1. California requires a purpose of “revenge, extortion, per-
suasion, or for any sadistic purpose.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 206 (West 2016). Note that Cali-
fornia courts have interpreted “sadistic purpose” as any defendant who derives pleasure from
causing pain. People v. Pre, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 739, 743 (Ct. App. 2004).
305. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.85 (2016).
306. See Copelon, supra note 5, at 329, 329 n.136; Rebecca B. Schechter, Note, Intentional
Starvation as Torture: Exploring the Gray Area Between Ill-Treatment and Torture, 18 AM. U.
INT’L L. REV. 1233, 1257 (2003).
307. See supra Part III.B.
308. See supra Part I.
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would craft a broader domestic violence statute defining it as vio-
lence done for the purpose of control.309 The list of purposes
contained in the California statute—“revenge, extortion, persuasion,
or for any sadistic purpose”310—would still work well in covering
domestic violence, perhaps with the addition of the word “control.”
Yet a torture statute should provide the insight of purpose
without actually requiring a prosecutor to prove purpose. Demon-
strating that the level of cruelty over time involved in domestic
violence is torture will necessarily show the judge or jury that the
defendant did not act out of whim or frustration.311 By its very
nature, torture implies premeditation and purpose. Requiring proof
of purpose to control, moreover, seems both pointless and arduous,
akin to suddenly requiring prosecutors to prove motive in every
case. The law generally does not require this kind of proof of
motive.312 A prosecutor can prove intentional murder, for example,
without ever understanding why the defendant chose to kill his
victim.313 Yet evidence of motive remains generally admissible, as
it would in a torture prosecution.314 Courts recognize that motive
evidence helps the jury understand and believe the other evidence
of the defendant’s guilt.315
A purpose requirement would add little and might even come at
significant cost. A prosecutor might prove a pattern of domestic
violence sufficient to show that the defendant acted intentionally
(rather than merely negligently) and that the defendant’s actions
309. Tuerkheimer, supra note 7, at 1019-20.
310. CAL. PENAL CODE § 206 (West 2016). The concept of “sadism” as a purpose would
capture much, but not all, of domestic violence. About 40 percent of men in Professor Dutton’s
treatment groups meet the diagnostic criteria for antisocial behavior. See DUTTON WITH
GOLANT, supra note 204, at 26. These men seem to take pleasure in violence and in their utter
lack of empathy find violence soothing. Id. Yet even these batterers are motivated by getting
their way. Id. at 28-29.
311. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 7, at 977; supra Part I.
312. See Burke, supra note 12, at 592 (“[H]ardly any rule of penal law is more definitely
settled than that motive is irrelevant.” (quoting JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIM-
INAL LAW 153 (1947))); Tuerkheimer, supra note 7, at 984-85. There are exceptions to this
general rule for crimes that revolve around motive, like hate crimes. See Wisconsin v.
Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 477-78 (1993) (holding that states could lawfully enhance punishment
for conduct based on disfavored motives); Allison Marston Danner, Bias Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity: Culpability in Context, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 389, 389 n.2 (2002).
313. See Burke, supra note 12, at 594; Tuerkheimer, supra note 7, at 984-85.
314. Tuerkheimer, supra note 7, at 984-85.
315. Id.
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thus demonstrate his intent to cause “severe physical or mental
pain or suffering.” Yet that prosecutor might seriously struggle to
further prove that the defendant intended to control the victim.
Ideally, every case would involve an exhibit of the batterer’s written
“rules” for the victim. In many cases, however, the batterer’s pur-
pose will remain more subtle and implied, and thus very difficult to
prove.
Under the proposed statute, the prosecutor must prove the de-
fendant’s specific intent to cause pain or suffering, without having
to prove a further motive to control the victim through that suf-
fering. The torture description, in and of itself, helps to clarify that
violence has a purpose without having to actually prove that
purpose in each case. And as with any motive, evidence of a con-
trolling purpose should remain admissible.316
C. Making Sure the Torture Statute Does Not Sit on a Shelf
Finally, crafting a statute and getting it passed by state legisla-
tures would constitute only the beginning of the effort to properly
redefine domestic violence as torture. The bigger step is to find per-
suasive ways to encourage police and prosecutors to make use of a
new torture statute.317 This will not be an easy task, but I will now
suggest some very pragmatic methods to try.
As described above, prosecutors in California and Michigan have
used their torture statutes in domestic violence cases.318 But given
the size of those states, and the relatively few appeals of torture
convictions, it seems unlikely that prosecutors make use of the
torture statutes as often as they could. The cases clearly focus on
the most egregious levels of violence, perhaps because those torture
statutes are drawn too narrowly, as I argue above.319 Michigan’s
requirement that the defendant have “custody or control” over the
victim and California’s requirement of “great bodily injury” would
make the statutes inapplicable to most domestic violence cases.320
316. Wright, supra note 278, at 561.
317. See generally Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243
(2011).
318. See supra notes 254-55 for descriptions of some of those cases.
319. See supra Part IV.A.
320. See supra Part IV.A.
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My hope is that a statute designed for the purpose of capturing
domestic violence would broaden its application. Even with this new
statute in place, there would remain a real risk that this felony
torture statute would remain unused, or used only in nondomestic
violence cases. Prosecutorial discretion can become a black hole that
swallows statutory law.321
The scale of the pragmatic problems involved in using a new
statute can be illustrated by statistics I have access to in my home
city. With a population of only about 390,000,322 New Orleans had
7390 9-1-1 calls complaining of domestic violence in the first six
months of 2015.323 Those calls resulted in 1690 arrests or warrants:
a charge rate of approximately 23 percent.324 The police booked 204
of those cases as felonies: 12 percent of all charged cases.325 After
screening, the district attorney added another 56 cases,326 bringing
the felony rate up to 15 percent.
The District Attorney’s Office assigns five prosecutors to their
misdemeanor domestic violence cases and chooses to prosecute these
cases in a Municipal Court.327 Each assistant district attorney there-
fore has a docket of approximately 60 cases a month, or about 3 new
cases per work day. Of the 1430 misdemeanor cases charged in six
months, prosecutors brought only 8 to trial, resulting in 7 acquittals
and 1 guilty verdict.328 Another 522 pleaded guilty, often to lesser
offenses, like trespassing or disturbing the peace.329 Presumably, the
rest were dismissed. Meanwhile, the domestic-violence-related
murders continue to pile up.330
321. See Fairfax, supra note 317, at 1261.
322. Quick Facts: New Orleans City, Louisiana, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, www.census.gov/
quickfacts/table/PST045215/2255000 [https://perma.cc/L5S2-6BPF].
323. NEW ORLEANS HEALTH DEPT., BLUEPRINT FOR SAFETY DOMESTIC VIOLENCE DATA
TRACKING (July 2015) [hereinafter NOLA BLUEPRINT 2015] (on file with the William & Mary
Law Review). This information was provided pursuant to a federally funded “Blueprint” pro-
ject in New Orleans, Louisiana, by the Police Department and District Attorney’s Office. The




327. See Alex Woodward, Domestic Violence: The DA’s Side, GAMBIT WKLY. (Dec. 9, 2013),
http://www.bestofneworleans.com/gambit/domestic-violence-the-das-side/Content?oid=
2285348 [https://perma.cc/4DQA-WUZT].
328. NOLA BLUEPRINT 2015, supra note 323.
329. Id.
330. In 2015, nine women and children were reportedly killed by abusers in New Orleans,
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In general, district attorney’s offices fear domestic violence pros-
ecutions, because they lower conviction rates.331 At the moment,
prosecutors succeed at tucking these cases away in their statistics
as mere misdemeanors, generally deemed unimportant by FBI
statistics and the press.332 Indeed, in 2011, the city of Topeka,
a city of fewer than 400,000 people. See, e.g., Jonathan Bullington, In Algiers Shooting, Years
of Abuse End in Daughter’s Heroic Act, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.nola.com/
crime/index.ssf/2015/02/in_algiers_pattern_of_abuse_en.html [https://perma.cc/YC8D-Q7Z4]
(reporting on Lindsey Crain, 28, who was killed by her stepfather with a shotgun as she pro-
tected her mother from him); Jonathan Bullington, McDonald’s Stabbing Victim IDed by
Orleans Coroner, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Mar. 23, 2015), http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2015/
03/woman_fatally_stabbed_at_elysi.html [https://perma.cc/NR79-QGS3] (reporting on Julia
Anderson, 23, who was stabbed in the neck by her boyfriend in a parking lot); Andy
Cunningham, Family of Murdered Mom, Daughter Speak Out After Accused Killer’s Arrest,
WDSU NEWS (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.wdsu.com/news/local-news/neworleans/family-of-
murdered-mom-daughter-speak-out-after-accused-killers-arrest/31658712 [https://perma.cc/
E7RD-UWC3] (reporting on Walesha Williams, 25, her daughter, Paris Williams, 8, and a
friend, who were all shot and killed by the mother’s ex-boyfriend); Ken Daley, Here’s How a
Broken Ankle Became a Homicide, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.nola.com/
crime/index.ssf/2015/03/heres_how_a_broken_ankle_became_a_homicide.html [https://perma.
cc/R47Y-35GA] (reporting on Teita Vaughn, 33, who died from a pulmonary embolism, after
her boyfriend attempted to throw her out of a window, and then broke her ankle by repeatedly
smashing it with an object until it cracked); Ken Daley, Slain Tulane Law Student Sara
LaMont ‘Always Was the Brightest Star,’ TIMES-PICAYUNE (Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.nola.
com/crime/index.ssf/2015/04/slain_tulane_law_student_alway.html [https://perma.cc/987H-
GSMU] (reporting on Sara LaMont, who was third in her class at Tulane Law School and
killed in an apparent murder-suicide by her boyfriend, also a Tulane Law School student);
Heather Nolan, Couple’s Death Investigated as Murder-Suicide: NOPD, TIMES-PICAYUNE
(June 30, 2015), http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2015/06/couples_death_investigated_
as.html [https://perma.cc/N2PQ-9QAZ] (reporting on Margaret Ambrose, 72, killed by her
husband in an apparent murder-suicide); Heather Nolan, Victim’s Boyfriend Is Suspect in
Metropolitan Street Shooting: NOPD, TIMES-PICAYUNE (June 4, 2015), http://www.nola.com/
crime/index.ssf/2015/06/metropolitan_street_shooting.html [https://perma.cc/KR37-TG7H] (re-
porting on Melissa Hunter, 23, who was shot multiple times by her boyfriend); Carlie
Kollath Wells, Algiers Woman Killed in Stabbing Identified by Coroner, TIMES-PICAYUNE
(Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2015/04/algiers_woman_stabbed_name.
html [https://perma.cc/E8FK-SDNF] (reporting on Esperanza Rojas, 25, who was stabbed
multiple times). See also Matt Sledge & John Simerman, Arrested NOPD Officer Wardell
Johnson Has History of Downplaying Domestic Violence Incidents, NEW ORLEANS ADVOCATE
(July 8, 2015, 9:03 AM), http://theadvocate.com/news/neworleans/neworleansnews/12847224-
123/arrested-nopd-officer-wardell-johnson [https://perma.cc/PD7Z-JULE].
331. See Mary De Ming Fan, Disciplining Criminal Justice: The Peril Amid the Promise of
Numbers, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 43-44 (2007).
332. Naomi Cahn, Innovative Approaches to the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Crimes:
An Overview, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE, 161, 162-
63 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1992) (“For battered women and their advocates,
prosecutors’ offices have often been a major impediment to improving the overall response of
the criminal justice system. Indeed, some prosecutors admit that they simply do not take
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Kansas, threatened to repeal its municipal domestic violence statute
in order to save money by not prosecuting the cases at all.333
Treating domestic violence as torture would ratchet up the
pressure to take these cases seriously as felonies.334 This only works,
however, if the police charge those cases as felonies in the first
place. Prosecutors are not measured by how many misdemeanor
arrests they fail to bump up to felonies; they are measured by how
many felony arrests they decline.335 Then, and only then, do the
cases become politically and statistically relevant in our current
regime.
Another probable hurdle is getting police to do full investigations
that could potentially lead to convictions under a torture statute.
Police are unlikely to do the kind of work required to identify pat-
terns of torture on the scene of a domestic violence arrest. First,
police avoid making difficult subjective statutory calls when they
can charge simpler lesser offenses.336 More importantly, the political
pressure to reduce crime rates has famously resulted in fewer
charging decisions.337 In an environment in which attempted murder
routinely becomes aggravated battery by shooting, felony torture
will probably result in an arrest for simple domestic violence,
instantly “reducing” that jurisdiction’s violent crime rate.
Ideally, the dedicated prosecutor—armed with excellent training,
infinite investigative resources, and the time to triage each case—
would make these charging decisions. This, of course, rarely oc-
domestic violence as seriously as other crimes.” (footnote omitted)); see also Hanna, supra note
118, at 1860-61 (“Prosecutors may also resist pursuing cases because they believe that
battering is a minor, private crime.”).
333. See A.G. Sulzberger, Facing Cuts, a City Repeals Its Domestic Violence Law, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/12/us/topeka-moves-to-decriminalize-
domestic-violence.html [https://perma.cc/AD3B-VYRU].
334. See, e.g., Hanna, supra note 118, at 1521 (“Of those cases that are prosecuted, many
are charged or pled down to misdemeanors despite facts that suggest the conduct constituted
a felony.”).
335. See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not
to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1715 (2010) (explaining that little evidence exists of
declination rates for felonies, and even less for misdemeanors).
336. For more on how police officers respond to domestic violence calls and arrests, see
BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 123, at 152-53. 
337. See, e.g., William K. Rashbaum, Retired Officers Raise Questions on Crime Data, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 6, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/07/nyregion/07crime.html [https://
perma.cc/2AT4-7FQU] (reporting that precinct commanders and administrators manipulated
Compstat data to favorably impact crime rate statistics for their precinct).
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curs.338 Yet, there are still two ways to encourage felony torture
prosecutions: first, by making torture easier and more obvious to
identify in police investigations, and second, by applying political
pressure to incentivize using the torture statute.
In order for this to work, police reports would need to include
questions about each of the torture techniques listed in the statute.
Some jurisdictions have already done this, in part by adding a
lethality assessment to police reports, to facilitate prosecutors’ bond
consideration and triage.339 In other jurisdictions, police ask victims
more general questions about their attackers’ history of violence
such as the following: “(1) How recent was the last violence?; (2) Is
the violence increasing in frequency?; (3) What types of violence and
threats are you experiencing?; and (4) Do you think [the offender]
will seriously injure or kill you or your children?”340
To capture the possibility of torture charges, a police report would
need to require officers to ask questions like these:
(1) How long has the offender abused you?
(2) How often does he hit you?
(3) What kinds of violence does he use against you? (Include a
checklist of types, including strangulation.)
(4) Does he hurt your children?
(5) Does he threaten you? What does he say?
(6) Does he threaten to hurt anyone else, including your chil-
dren?
(7) Does he have a weapon?
(8) Does he point a weapon at you or intimidate you with it?
338. See Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive
Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 262-63 (2011).
339. See JILL THERESA MESSING ET AL., POLICE DEPARTMENTS’ USE OF THE LETHALITY
ASSESSMENT PROGRAM: A QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION, at i (2014), https://www.ncjrs.
gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/247456.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BEK-3RUX].
340. See CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, THE NEW ORLEANS BLUEPRINT FOR SAFETY 15 (Oct. 21,
2014), http://www.nola.gov/health-department/domestic-violence-prevention/domestic-
violence-documents/blueprint-for-safety-opening-pages-and-chapter-one/ [https://perma.cc/
P4CM-J7SE] (alteration in original); see also SECOND JUDICIAL DIST. VIOLENCE COORDINATION
COUNCIL, GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES FOR DOMESTIC ABUSE -RELATED CRIMINAL CASES
56 (4th ed. Jan. 1, 2013), http://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/ media/second_district/
documents/Criminal_Court/Guidelines_DA_Related_Cases_Crim.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4A3-
QVC2] (St. Paul, Minnesota); CITY OF DULUTH, THE DULUTH BLUEPRINT FOR SAFETY 39
(Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.theduluthmodel.org/cms/files/4-Duluth-law-enforcement-chapter-
3.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2R9-65M3] (Duluth, Minnesota).
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(9) Does he force you to perform sex acts that you do not want to
do?
(10) Does he call you names? What names?
(11) Does he purposefully keep you from sleeping?
(12) Does he control you?
(13) Does he check your phone or your email, or demand to know
your whereabouts?
(14) Do you believe that he will kill you or your children?341
Police policy would need to insist on officers asking these ques-
tions as part of every domestic violence call, and, of course, to allow
officers to spend more time responding to such calls. On a pragmatic
note, officers often fill in these reports using drop-down menus,
which can require particular questions to be answered.
Police reports listing each of the graphic and gripping details
relevant to a torture charge would make it easier for a prosecutor
to screen the case and to understand that a torture statute could
apply. Without those facts, we would be relying too heavily on
prosecutors’ time and willingness to interview victims themselves
in order to determine the context of cases. Moreover, these prosecu-
tor interviews often come too late, after the batterer has had time
to intimidate and coerce his victim to be uncooperative with the
system.
Just as importantly, such reports would amp up the political pres-
sure to prosecute felony torture. This would not happen in a direct
way; the news would not report on the number of cases that could
have been charged as felonies but were not. Instead, prosecutors
will know that they face a ticking time bomb of cases in which any
facts relevant to the risk of homicide are clearly laid out but
ignored. Once a felony torture statute exists and a police report
documents a torture chamber in graphic detail, the district at-
torney’s office will suddenly become far more culpable for failing to
protect the victim.
341. I include this last question because it has proved to be a fairly accurate predictor of
the chances of homicide. See Judith A. Wolfer, Top 10 Myths About Domestic Violence, 42 MD.
B. J. 38, 40 (2009) (“The second highest predictor of whether a woman will be killed by an
intimate partner is his threat to kill her.” (citing Jacquelyn C. Campbell et al., Risk Factors
for Femicide in Abusive Relationships: Results from a Multisite Case Control Study, 93 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 1089, 1089-97 (2003))).
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CONCLUSION
“The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.”342 In
many ways, we have failed both culturally and in our criminal
justice system to understand the full horror of domestic violence
because we simply lack the proper language to describe it. Identify-
ing domestic violence as torture gives us a name for the scope of
the terror batterers inflict. It reveals domestic violence as a pattern
of accumulated cruelty, with searing psychological scars often worse
than the physical pain. It redirects our focus away from blaming
victims and instead focuses on the cold calculation of the batterer. 
Prosecuting domestic violence as torture would save lives.
Batterers would face serious felony charges for years of terrorizing
a victim, rather than disjointed misdemeanor offenses. Judges could
correctly calculate the danger of witness tampering and homicide
during bond consideration. For the first time, police, prosecutors,
judges, and juries could hear the full story of a pattern of torture
rather than a single, isolated incident. The system would gain a
better understanding of the motives of both abusers and their
terrified victims.
342. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS 74 (C.K. Ogden trans.,
Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., LTD. 1922) (1921).
